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After independence in 1960 the economy of Cote d’Ivoire was heralded as one of the success 
stories of Sub-Saharan Africa. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 8.1 percent per year 
from 1960 to 1979, so that per capita GDP increased in real terms from $595 to $1114.
1 This 
economic boom was led by increasing agricultural exports, principally cocoa and coffee. 
Cocoa and coffee exports in 1961 equaled $112 million or 51 percent of total exports, with 
agricultural exports accounting for 61 percent of total exports. By the late 1970s, cocoa and 
coffee exports amounted to $1.5 billion, and were then 53 percent of total exports, with 
agricultural exports still accounting for 61 percent of total exports (FAOSTAT 2006; World 
Bank 2006b). Cote d’Ivoire has emerged as the world’s largest cocoa exporter as a result, 
now accounting for as much as 40 percent of world cocoa trade, and during the 1960s and 
1970s was Africa’s largest coffee exporter. Coffee exports have fallen to only 4 percent of 
agricultural exports in 2004, however, while cocoa has increased to over 70 percent, with 
agricultural exports now still accounting for 43 percent of total merchandise exports. 
Several economists and political scientists sought to explain the unique features of 
agricultural policy in Cote d’Ivoire which gave rise to this better economic performance than 
was found elsewhere in Africa, and was based on agricultural exports (Boone 1995, Hecht 
1983, Widner 1993, Woods 2003, 2004). That set of studies, and most attention now directed 
at the agricultural sector of Cote d’Ivoire, has focused on policy for the cocoa and coffee 
sectors. In this study, that focus will remain, although another agricultural export success, 
cotton, and one of Cote d’Ivoire’s most important agricultural imports, rice, are also 
examined. Also examined briefly are wheat, which is imported but not produced in Cote 
d’Ivoire, and coarse grains, roots and tubers, for which trade is very limited and that trade is 
mainly with neighboring countries rather than the broader international market. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s agricultural exports benefited from the commodity boom of the late 
1970s, and then suffered along with those of many other developing countries after 1979. 
                                                 
1 GDP per capita measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2006b). 
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Both economic outcomes and trade policy were strongly influenced by volatile international 
agricultural commodity prices. GDP declined 11 percent in 1980 and the economic growth 
rate averaged only 0.7 percent per year from 1980 through 1994. Per capita GDP fell to $579 
in 1994, less than what it was in 1960 (World Bank 2006b), and remained only $574 in 2004. 
Agricultural exports fell to about 60 percent of total exports, and cocoa and coffee exports 
were about 40 percent of total exports and two-thirds of agricultural exports (FAOSTAT 
2006). In the case of cocoa, apart from heavy taxation its problems were largely due to low, 
volatile international prices as production continued to grow, leveling off in some years. In 
the case of coffee, yields and production have declined, and were quite erratic over this later 
period. Cotton exports followed a similar pattern, although starting from a very low level in 
the early 1960s but reaching nearly 5 percent of exports in 1991, and varying around 2.5-3 
percent of exports recently.  
Structural adjustment reforms began in the early 1980s as economic recession set in 
and export revenues failed to keep pace with imports. Cote d’Ivoire is part of the West 
African currency union, sharing its currency, the CFA, with neighboring French West 
African countries, and receiving support from the French central bank. Devaluation was 
(politically) hard to implement, and did not occur until 1994, when the CFA was devalued by 
50 percent. Agricultural policy was managed by parastatal monopolies, such as CAISTAB 
(Caisse de stabilisation) in the cases of cocoa and coffee and CIDT (Compagnie Ivoirienne 
pour le développement des fibres textiles) for cotton, utilizing institutional frameworks 
derived from French colonial heritage. Privatization of those parastatals was an objective of 
international donors, but was slow in coming and sporadic in Cote d’Ivoire, as it was resisted 
by the government. CAISTAB continued to regulate cocoa and coffee trade until 2000, and 
the government’s majority interest in cotton companies created from CIDT (CIDT, Ivoire 
Coton) were not divested until 2002 (IMF 2002). Trade liberalization, a part of the structural 
adjustment program, was implemented in fits and starts, with periods when tariffs were 
reduced, followed by periods when they rose again. Quantitative restrictions have 
accompanied parastatal management of agricultural trade, and may still remain in the case of 
rice through “voluntary” administered prices (OECD 2006). 
Cote’ d’Ivoire’s agricultural economy has focused on smallholder farming and export 
crops. Those farmers and their exports were heavily taxed. In spite of structural adjustment 
reforms, which included the reduction of agricultural export taxes as one of its goals, taxation 
of cocoa and coffee exports (especially cocoa) remains a hallmark of Ivorian policy. Those 
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taxes were reduced briefly around the time of privatization of CAISTAB, but were 
subsequently raised for key agricultural exports so that export tax revenue in 2003 amounted 
to nearly a quarter of government revenue. Import tariff revenue is important, as well, at 30 
percent of government revenue in 2003 (World Bank 2006b). 
Policy has usually discouraged food crop production, against the wishes of farmers. 
Rice and wheat are the predominant cereal imports, with coarse grains, like roots and tubers, 
behaving like non-tradeables. Rice imports surged during the commodity boom of the late 
1970s, were generally flat during the recession until 1994 apart from a brief surge in the mid-
1980s, and have increased again since 1994. The mid-1980s import surge gave rise to a 
policy focus on self sufficiency, which briefly slowed but never eliminated imports. Wheat 
imports emerged in the late 1970s, as well, and have also been increasing since 1994. 
The recent need for tax revenue from exports derives from political events that have 
also negatively impacted on economic performance. While the devaluation in 1994 initially 
led to a resurgence in economic growth, the first coup d’état in 1999 and continuing civil 
conflict have hampered the economy; and, since 2002, they have divided the country, with 
the northern part of the country still held by rebel troops as of 2007. Since cocoa and coffee 
are grown in the south, the effects of the civil war have been mostly seen in the resumption of 
export taxes and increased trader margins. Crops predominantly grown in the north, such as 
cotton and maize, have been more severely affected, and smuggling to neighboring countries 
has affected both management of the cotton sector, another successful agricultural export at 
one time, as well as collection of data on conditions in the Ivorian agricultural economy. The 
need for rice and wheat imports must result in part because they are mostly produced in the 
north while there is a need for food in the urban areas of the south. In its assessment of the 
outlook for the Ivorian economy more generally, the OECD (2006) cited problems due to 
continuing civil conflict as being key to future economic performance. 
The mystery of Cote d’Ivoire’s agricultural policy and economic performance is the 
continuing success of the cocoa sector in spite of heavy taxation. Hecht (1983, p. 26) wrote 
“…the government has consistently followed a set of policies designed to encourage 
expansion of cocoa and coffee production, while at the same time taxing small-holders 
heavily for capital accumulation and investment elsewhere in the economy. Other countries 
… have also tried to finance public expenditure in a similar fashion, but have ended up by 
either crippling or retarding this sector. The Ivory Coast, on the other hand, has successfully 
nurtured this golden goose, and exploited its precious eggs – without killing the animal.” This 
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quote remains remarkably relevant. Cocoa export volume has grown steadily since 1960, with 
a plateau from 1987 until 1994, and again since 1999, but without periods of decline in 
exports, production or area planted. During none of those periods were there sustained 
increases in farm-gate prices. Attempts to estimate supply response for cocoa are plagued by 
data exhibiting increases in production as prices, particularly in international markets, fall 
(Maizels, Bacon and Mavrotas 1997). Pricing has been stabilized (somewhat) by CAISTAB, 
so that farmers have not felt the full effect of drops in international commodity prices, have 
not seen nominal price declines, and, because of currency stability, have not seen the erratic 
pricing in some neighboring cocoa-exporting countries (e.g. Ghana – see Brooks, 
Croppenstedt and Aggrey-Fynn 2007). Analysts attribute increasing production in the face of 
low and sometimes falling real prices to liberal immigration and land tenure policies (Boone 
1995, Widner 1993, Woods 2003, 2004). This goes a long way toward explaining growth 
until 1994, which was due largely to area expansion, but cannot account for the increasing 
yields and constant area planted since then, as well as the change since 1993 in attitudes and 
policy toward immigrants, which lies behind the civil conflict of this decade. 
Measures of distortions to agricultural incentives reflect this continuing taxation of 
agricultural exports, and administered pricing in the case of rice. While structural adjustment 
reforms have aimed at liberalizing trade by Cote d’Ivoire, and have at times succeeded in 
doing so, the civil conflict since 1999 has driven a desire for tax revenue from agriculture and 
continued limitations on imports. Farm-gate prices for cocoa have varied between 35 and 60 
percent of border prices, changing inversely with international prices and reaching 100 
percent of international prices in the early 1990s when world cocoa prices were very low. 
Since 2000 they have remained around 40 percent of border prices. Coffee farm-gate prices 
have also varied, in part in relation to world prices, at around 40 to 60 percent of world 
prices. Some very low price ratios are observed when world coffee prices rose, and coffee 
prices according to most recent data are about 40-50 percent of border prices. Cotton farm-
gate prices have also been a low share of world prices, averaging around 54 percent and 
reaching 63 percent in recent years, although the cotton margins reflect also ginning costs of 
parastatals. Rice farm-gate prices have a much higher share of world prices, varying from 65 
percent to 100 percent and sometimes even higher, reaching over 120 percent in recent years. 
Stabilization in the face of volatile international prices, effects of the recent civil conflict, and 
structural adjustment reforms earlier, are all evident in the extent of taxation of export 
agriculture in Cote d’Ivoire.  
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In the next section, more detail on Cote d’Ivoire’s economic performance is provided. 
The role of agriculture in the economy, and particularly in exports, is then explored further. A 
brief historical overview of agricultural policy is then provided, showing the colonial roots of 
policy institutions and the importance of structural adjustment reforms. Policies and 
performance for the four key agricultural sectors – cocoa, coffee, cotton, and cereals – are 
then examined. The data on prices and performance, based on sources noted in the Appendix, 
are used to quantify the extent of distortions to agricultural incentives in Cote d’Ivoire. The 
concluding section summarizes what has been learned about both the extent of distortions and 
the political economy factors determining those distortions.  
 
 
Economic and trade performance  
 
 
In 2005 GDP per capita was at $563 in real terms (constant 2000 US dollars). This low 
income level reflects an inability to sustain the success of the first twenty years after 
independence, from 1960 to 1979, and is also due to the costs of continuing civil conflict.
2 
GDP growth averaged 8.1 percent per year from 1960 until 1979, and was nearly 10 percent 
per year during the commodity boom, from 1975 to 1979. Per capita GDP reached its peak at 
$1114 in 1978, and has subsequently declined to levels below that found in 1960. A recession 
due to low export earnings and over extended public debt ensued from 1979 and led to 
persistent negative economic growth until 1994. The devaluation of the CFA in 1994 briefly 
spurred economic growth, which averaged 6.3 percent per year until 1999. The ongoing civil 
conflict has resulted in stagnation, with negative economic growth from 1999 to 2004, 
averaging -0.55 percent per year (Appendix Figure 1). 
Trade, and especially agricultural trade, has been important to the evolution of the 
Ivorian economy. In 2005 exports represented 50 percent of GDP while imports equaled 40 
percent of GDP. At peak GDP in 1978, exports and imports were each already 37 percent of 
GDP. Just before the devaluation of 1994, exports had declined to 29 percent of GDP while 
imports were only 26 percent of GDP at the overvalued exchange rate (World Bank 2006b). 
                                                 
2 Economic performance data are from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006b) and from the IMF 
(2006). 
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Immediately after the devaluation, exports rose to 40 percent of GDP, while imports averaged 
about one-third of GDP.  
Trade taxes have been an important source of revenue for the government. Export 
taxes accounted for 24 percent of revenue in 2003, while customs duties contributed 30 
percent of revenue. Export taxes were only 12 percent of revenue in 1998, a consequence of 
structural adjustment reforms, while customs duties have remained steady at about one-third 
of revenue. Since the GATT’s Uruguay Round, Cote d’Ivoire has maintained a relatively 
uniform tariff schedule at typically a 20 percent ad valorem rate, with some exceptions. A 
value added tax (VAT), now at 18 percent, also applies to imports as well as domestically 
produced goods locally consumed (World Bank 2006a). 
In 2003, agricultural exports were nearly 60 percent of total exports. Cocoa in 2003 
accounted for 37 percent of exports, while coffee was 2.2 percent of exports and cotton was 
2.9 percent of exports (Appendix Figure 2). In 1978 agriculture accounted for about 72 
percent of exports, with cocoa contributing 31 percent of exports, coffee 21 percent and 
cotton 1.2 percent. Hence, cocoa has increased in importance, while coffee has declined 
considerably and cotton has become somewhat more important.  
Food imports were 26 percent of imports in 2003, and only 10.5 percent of imports in 
1978, but had risen to about one-quarter of imports by the mid-1980s and have remained 
there since. Rice in 2003 represented 3.2 percent of total imports while wheat was about 1.5 
percent of imports (Appendix Figure 3). All of these shares show considerable variation, 
reflecting both events in Cote d’Ivoire and the instability of international commodity prices. 
The effects of efforts to limit rice imports around the mid-1980s are particularly evident. 
Trade and economic growth have both been influenced by exchange rate policy. Cote 
d’Ivoire’s currency is the CFA, which is also used in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal  and Togo. The BCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) was 
created in 1946 by France to support its colonies and remained in force after independence. 
This currency continued to be supported and managed by the French central bank, who also 
attempted to impose monetary and fiscal disciplines on the governments of participating 
countries (van de Walle 1991). When borrowing evaded those disciplines and this currency 
became overvalued, the French central bank was required to inject considerable capital into 
the West African central bank (BCEAO) and thereby to the economy of Cote d’Ivoire. In the 
early period, from 1960 to 1979, this system created a stable foreign currency, avoiding 
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hyperinflation or large black market premiums, in contrast to many experiences elsewhere in 
Africa.  
A parallel (black market) exchange rate for the CFA has been collected by Easterly 
(2006), which shows only very small back market premiums from 1960 to 1970 and again in 
the late 1970s to early 1980s, and no premiums in other years. It is not surprising that there 
were never large black market premiums, given the capital inflows from France and the 
extent of convertibility of this currency. But the real exchange rate (REER) estimated by the 
IMF, based on differential inflation, shows the overvaluation of the recession of the 1980s, 
and the need for the devaluation of 1994, which brought this measure of the real exchange 
rate and the official rate back into alignment. (Appendix Figure 4 shows the official exchange 
rate in Cote d’Ivoire from 1960 until 2005. It also shows the CPI, a measure of inflation, as 
well as two indicators of real exchange rates, and so the extent of overvaluation over time.) 
This index suggests overvaluation of 54 percent in 1980, and more than 40 percent from 1987 
until the devaluation in 1994. The IMF’s REER is a useful measure to use to reflect 
distortions to incentives due to exchange rate misalignment, and to show the underlying story 
about exchange rates in Cote d’Ivoire. Real and official exchange rates were quite close, 
showing little overvaluation, hence distortion, except from 1980 until 1994. The IMF’s 
REER is used below as this study’s proxy for a parallel market exchange rate: as discussed 
below, it shows a bias against agricultural exports and in favor of food imports only during 
this protracted recession.  
 
 
Agriculture’s role in the economy 
 
 
Cote d’Ivoire has remained a largely rural society: 82 percent of the population was rural in 
1960, 64 percent remained rural in 1979, and still 55 percent in 2005  (World Bank 2006b). 
As of 2003 value added from agriculture contributed nearly one-quarter of GDP. At $1048 
per worker, agricultural value added is 2.7 times greater than that found elsewhere in Sub 
Saharan Africa (FAO 2003). These data reflect some industrialization and urbanization, as 
agriculture contributed nearly half of GDP in 1960. But as the trade statistics above 
demonstrate, agricultural exports remain critically important to this economy. While coffee 
has declined in importance, cocoa remains Cote d’Ivoire’s key export, and a number of other 
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tropical products (e.g. bananas, pineapples) and cotton are exported as well. Nevertheless, in 
many respects Cote d’Ivoire is a classic example of a developing economy heavily dependent 
on a single commodity export. Cognizant of this, the government has on several occasions 
pursued diversification strategies, but to little effect. 
Cote d’Ivoire’s 32 million hectares can be divided into two distinct parts – the tropical 
rain forests of the south and the savannahs of the north. Cocoa and coffee as well as tropical 
fruits and vegetables are grown in the southern region, while cotton, maize and cassava are 
grown in the north. Rice is mostly grown in the north, while some rice is grown in the forest 
areas of the southwest. Only 7 percent of the rice area is irrigated, and most rice is upland 
varieties (WARDA 2006, FAO 2003). Forests accounted for 31 percent of area in 1995 but 
only 22 percent in 2002, reflecting serious deforestation. Traditional cocoa planting 
techniques coexist with rain forest, but modern techniques utilizing fertilizer eliminate the 
forest cover. This deforestation reflects the limitations now experienced to expanding the area 
planted to cocoa and coffee, and shifts to new techniques in some areas (Ahmend, Kazianga 
and Sanders 2005). Land nevertheless remains relatively abundant, as cultivable land 
represents 75 percent of total area whereas actually cultivated land is only 30 percent (FAO 
2003). Cereal production is on only 4 percent of area in Cote d’Ivoire, while pasture accounts 
for over 40 percent of area (FAO 2003).  
Small scale farmers, who on average own 4 hectares, are the rule for most agricultural 
activities, including cocoa, coffee and cotton production. Over 500,000 smallholders plant 
cocoa in Cote d’Ivoire. Large plantations are found mainly for bananas, rubber, palm oil and 
pineapple, and account for only a small share of agricultural production in Cote d’Ivoire 
(FAO 2003).  
While cocoa and coffee, including processed product exports, contributed on average 
over 70 percent of agricultural exports during the late 1990s, other agricultural exports matter 
as well. Cotton averaged nearly 7 percent of agricultural exports, and other important exports 
included pineapple (2.1 percent), bananas (3.0 percent), palm oil (2.7 percent), rubber (3.5 
percent) and logs (0.6 percent) (FAOSTAT 2006). Canned fish also accounted for nearly 6 
percent of exports. Shares of food imports in the late 1990s were 20 percent for rice, 29 
percent for fish, 8.8 percent for dairy products, 9.5 percent for wheat, 3.7 percent for sugar 
and 3.8 percent for tobacco (FAO 2003).  
Since Cote d’Ivoire is dependent on commodity exports, performance is strongly 
determined by international prices which have been quite volatile since 1960. (Appendix 
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Figure 5 shows international price indices for key agricultural goods – cocoa, coffee, cotton, 
maize and rice.) These nominal prices show a pattern of correlation among international 
commodity prices, and key periods when high and low prices have occurred. High prices 
prevailed for all these commodities during the mid- to late 1970s, with declines particularly 
evident for cocoa and coffee starting in 1979. A second common peak occurs around 1995, 
and low prices for all these commodities are found around 2000. The magnitude of these 
variations is also striking. Cocoa reached nearly $3800 per metric ton before the decline (in 
1977), fell below $1000 per metric ton in 2000, increased because of civil conflict in 2002,
3 
but by 2007 was only about $1500 per ton. Coffee reached nearly $5000 per metric ton in 
1976, and fell to less than $1000 per metric ton both in 1991 and from 2000 to 2003. By 
comparison, rice, maize and cotton prices seem less volatile, but these prices also reveal 
considerable variability. There are some commodity specific trends, but strong correlation 
among all the international commodity prices. Cote d’Ivoire’s export revenues have been 
dependent on some of the most volatile commodity prices, and these international price 
variations are much larger than domestic distortions. In spite of its efforts to stabilize prices, 
domestic prices of key exports have seen some effects from these trends. This is more evident 
in recent years as structural adjustment reforms have eliminated mechanisms to stabilize 
domestic prices (CAISTAB, CIDT), but private traders have absorbed some price instability. 
 
 
History of agricultural policy incentives, interventions and reforms  
 
 
Various analysts have offered different period delineations of Cote d’Ivoire’s economic and 
political events, depending on their objectives. In particular, the recession and structural 
adjustment period has been divided by some, to account for ups and downs in liberalization 
efforts and the end of the Presidency of Houphouet Boigny. Political events have influenced 
the evolution of agricultural policy and helped to define these periods (Appendix Table 1). 
For the purposes of this chapter’s focus on distortions to agricultural incentives, it will be 
sufficient to follow the divisions used to this point, namely, 1960-1979 (initial economic 
                                                 
3 Since Cote d’Ivoire exports as much as 40 percent of the world’s cocoa, it may be a large country affecting the 
world price. Yilmaz (1999) has investigated the optimal export tax under this circumstance, and argues this is 
the case. In the trade, an increase in world market prices for cocoa has been attributed to the civil conflict in 
Cote d’Ivoire, with spikes evident at critical times.  
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success after independence), 1980-1993 (recession and structural adjustment), 1994-1998 
(post-devaluation reforms and resurgence), and 1999-present (civil conflict and economic 




The institutional development behind agricultural policy, and indeed all policy evolution, was 
conditioned by Cote d’Ivoire’s experience as a French colony. Cote d’Ivoire officially 
became a French colony in 1893, became an autonomous republic within the French 
community in 1958, and achieved full independence in August 1960 (US Dept. of State 
2003). As a colony, it was a source of agricultural exports to Europe, with cocoa and coffee 
plantations being established alongside smallholder farms beginning in the 1920s (FAO 
2003). Cotton production was also developed from about the same time. According to Bassett 
(1988, p. 269), “The first period (1910-22) saw the establishment of the conditions for 
commodity production through the development of transportation networks, the activities of 
merchant houses and the imposition of export-oriented cotton production.”  
One consequence of the French colonial period was establishment of the infrastructure 
and institutional structures that characterized Ivorian agriculture and policy afterwards. It is 
still the case that transportation costs within Cote d’Ivoire are lower than elsewhere in Africa, 
which is due to the roads and railroad built by the French. And the cotton parastatal, CIDT, 
was fashioned after the French public company CFDT (Compagnie Française pour le 
développement des fibres textiles). Parastatals dominated agricultural export policy 
institutions until well after the 1994 devaluation and privatization demands of structural 
adjustment reforms. By the time of independence the structure of smallholder agriculture now 
found in cocoa, coffee and cotton had been established, even though the colonial era included 
periods of forced labor and coercion and French settlers had established plantations for cocoa 
and coffee in the south that required significant labor from other areas of Cote d’Ivoire 
(Bassett 1988). The focus of policy on export crops at the expense of food production also 




   
  
11
From independence until 1993, Houghphouet Boigny served as president, and the first multi-
party elections did not occur until 1990. Several analysts (Boone 1995, Hecht 1983, Widner 
1993, Woods 2003; 2004) debate the importance of having a president with rural roots and 
who continued to own agricultural assets, but it is clear that Houghphouet Boigny pursued 
policies to support Ivorian export agriculture, while managing to extract significant export 
taxes from the sector. Hecht (1983) in particular notes the success of this regime, contrasting 
it with other African economies where agricultural taxation ultimately harmed export revenue 
generation.  
While some authors claim high prices as part of the regime, prices as a share of 
international prices then for cocoa, coffee and cotton were only somewhat higher, at 40-55 
percent, than these shares were during the recession period or now. International price levels 
probably played a bigger role in determining these shares than did domestic or trade policy. 
In the case of cocoa, administered prices never fell in nominal terms and the stability of the 
CFA meant that hyper-inflation never eroded the value of those administered prices. Coffee’s 
subsequent decline is also explained partially by the more erratic policy subsequently applied 
in that sector.  
The growth in exports, particularly of cocoa, is attributed to available rain forest and 
supportive immigration and land tenure policies which allowed immigrants from elsewhere in 
West Africa not only to provide labor but also to “own” their own farms with the knowledge 
that they could maintain control of their land as long as they were productive. Ruf (1995) and 
Lopez (1998) argue that this regime exploited a forest rent which led not only to area 
expansion as the engine of growth but also to pioneering new areas rather than replanting 
older trees to maintain yields. The opportunities for immigrants on smallholder cocoa farms, 
particularly relative to returns to subsistence crops in their home countries, explains why 
estimations of supply response often yielded incorrectly signed estimates, as these 
institutional factors dominated. Bassett (1998) also notes the importance of the technical 
package for cotton which gave rise to its initial success in the mid-1960s, and which came 
from the French through CIDT. Several authors note that during this period parastatals not 
only administered markets, but also provided extension and research services to farmers as 
well as organizing input supplies. 
French and other African colonial agricultural institutions are often contrasted, 
especially for cocoa. Boone (1995, p. 447) in particular describes Ivorian parastatal 
management as “relatively laissez faire”. In the cases of cocoa and coffee, while the 
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parastatal (CAISTAB) set administered prices and provided public goods (extension, inputs), 
private agents were allowed to conduct trade, and the state intervened little in the production 
process itself. Ivorian management of cocoa and coffee can be contrasted not only with the 
approaches in Ghana and other important cocoa producing countries, where state agents 
bought and sold all cocoa and influenced production techniques, but also with its own 
management of cotton by CIDT, which is more similar to public management found 
elsewhere. This was probably necessitated by the agronomy of cotton, which is much more 
intensive in inputs and requires a more sophisticated technology than traditional cocoa 
production. The need for fewer inputs into cocoa permitted the successful strategy described 
by Boone (1995), which may have become less successful as access to new rainforest 
diminished and more intensive practices as well as methods to avoid disease became more 
necessary.  
 
Recession and structural adjustment 
 
During the structural adjustment era there was significant variation in the extent of protection, 
and in liberalization in response to IMF initiatives, driven in part by variations in export 
earnings (Kouassy, Pegatienan and Ngaladjo 2004). Tariffs had reached an average of 32 
percent by 1989, fell to 24 percent by 1993, and following the 1994 devaluation were reduced 
to an average of 20 percent, similar to current levels (FAO 2003).  
  While structural adjustment reforms began with recession and public debt in the early 
1980s, significant changes to agricultural policy were a long time in coming over this period. 
Parastatals persisted in spite of international donors’ insistence on privatization, until 1995 in 
the case of rice, 1998 (really 2002) in the case of cotton,
4 and 2000 in the cases of cocoa and 
coffee. Effective protection had significantly increased in the early 1980s, so in 1984 tariff 
reforms were instituted to foster industrialization (FAO 2003). Variations in world prices, 
especially for cocoa and coffee, and financial difficulties following from the liberalization, 
led to reversal of policies in the late 1980s and then to a return to liberalization in the early 
1990s, which was consolidated by the devaluation of 1994 (Kouassy, Pegatienan and 
Ngaladjo 2004). Parastatals and the government implemented quantitative restrictions on 
trade during this period as well.  
                                                 
4 CIDT was broken into regional companies in 1998, including one still called Nouvelle CIDT, Compagnie 
Cotonniere, and Ivoire Coton, but the government did not divest its majority interest in these regional companies 
until 2002. 
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Rice self- sufficiency was administered through a parastatal (Caisse générale de 
péréquation des prix) created during this period, who managed the market, provided 
extension services and invested in irrigation. Rice prices even exceeded border prices by 
more than 50 percent for a few years in the mid-1980s (when world prices were very low). 
This, and quantitative restrictions on wheat imports, were the only significant deviations in 
policy focus away from export crops. Investments in sectors to diversify exports from cocoa 
and coffee had been found even in earlier periods, including the late 1970s, and are found in 
later periods, as stabilization revenues for cocoa and coffee were instead spent on public 
investments in other sectors. Few of these diversification projects succeeded. 
The debate over CFA devaluation is also characteristic of the recession/structural 
adjustment reform era. Evidence of overvaluation as high as 50 percent (based on the REER) 
is seen as early as 1980, and persisted until the 1994 devaluation (Appendix Figure 4). French 
intervention and political problems of a devaluation of a currency shared by several countries 
delayed the devaluation, and it was resisted by Houphouet Boigny until his death in 1993 
(van der Walle 1991). But public debt accumulated to crisis levels, so a step was taken as an 
economic necessity in spite of serious political concerns, even over the potential collapse of 
the CFA as a currency. This overvaluation is the primary characteristic defining this period as 
being unique in terms of relative agricultural distortions. 
Variations in cocoa and coffee prices and export revenue lay behind the weakening 
international financial positions in West Africa. CAISTAB shielded cocoa farmers from 
much of the international price variations, with remarkably stable nominal, domestic cocoa 
prices over this period of enormous change in international prices. Coffee prices showed 
more variability, though hardly all of international price variability. From 1979 to 1999, the 
standard deviation of domestic cocoa prices was 37 percent of that for border prices in CFA, 
and for coffee the standard deviation of the domestic price was 39 percent of the border price 
in CFA and 167 percent of the standard deviation in cocoa domestic prices. The 1994 
devaluation was also more evident in nominal coffee, cereals and cotton prices than for cocoa 
prices. Administered prices in the case of cocoa prevented operation of the mechanism by 
which devaluation could succeed. The surprising result is that cocoa remained the dominant 
crop, and continued to expand even when land availability restrictions began to bind. 
 
Devaluation and privatization  
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More serious efforts to liberalize Ivorian trade and to privatize Ivorian agricultural markets 
followed the 1994 devaluation, if slowly for some sectors. Privatization of a previously state 
run economy, as noted above, was an important part of the reform package and was 
eventually implemented for these crops, although gradually and with resistance from the 
government and the sector. Tariffs were also reduced following the devaluation. By 1995, 
tariffs averaged 24 percent and the VAT averaged 17 percent. These were somewhat lower 
for agricultural products (at 17 and 9.5 percent, respectively) but similar for food products (at 
25 and 14 percent) (WTO 1995). The devaluation succeeded in stimulating the Ivorian 
economy, which grew rapidly again after 1994 and until the period of civil conflict began in 
1999. The efforts to privatize overlap these two later periods, continuing until 2002 when the 
last support from the IMF was received in Cote d’Ivoire. 
The devaluation period also marks the beginning of change in immigration policy 
which had fueled growth in cocoa production until then. Houphouet Boigny’s successor ran 
on a liberal immigration campaign, but subsequently introduced the concept of “Ivoirite”. 
Immigration had provided necessary labor earlier, while only limited benefits from the cocoa 
and coffee successes filtered back to farmers. Limitations on land to expand, and less 
economic success, made it more difficult for Ivorians to share the benefits of agricultural 
production with immigrants. Political problems to follow often involved issues related to the 
consequences of immigration, and immigrants were important in the political crises in the 
current decade. 
Better economic performance and significant steps toward liberalization characterized 
the period just after the 1994 devaluation. But that period also marked a change in attitudes 
toward immigration and limitations were finally reached in the rain forest frontier, giving rise 
to new strategies to expand cocoa production. The military coup d’état in 1999 brought the 
end to this period, and continuing civil conflict has hampered economic performance and 
particularly agriculture in the north of the country. Remarkably, cocoa output has remained 
relatively stable over this period. 
 
Civil conflict  
 
Elections were reestablished in 2000, but another failed coup d’état occurred in 2002, and 
then a rebel uprising divided the country between the north and south. That division was still 
in place in 2007 in spite of numerous international efforts to end the dispute. Immigration and 
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eligibility for the presidency were key issues in this dispute, and in 2004 there was a mass 
exodus of workers from the south (OECD 2006). In 2005 presidential elections were 
postponed due to continuing conflict and had not yet been held as of 2007. 
Efforts to liberalize the Ivorian economy continued until 2002, the last time that Cote 
d’Ivoire received financial assistance from the IMF ((IMF 2002, OECD 2006). CAISTAB 
and the cocoa and coffee sectors were privatized in 2000. Cotton, sugar, rubber, palm oil and 
pineapple holdings of the government were divested in 2002 at the request of the IMF. 
Several professional associations were created to replace the privatized parastatals. The BCC 
(Coffee and Cocoa Marketing Exchange) and ARCC (Coffee and Cocoa Regulatory 
Authority) took over CAISTAB functions for cocoa and coffee, and SOFICOCI was created 
to help finance cotton. But subsequently export taxes were raised to generate more public 
revenue during this crisis period.  
The north-south division affected agricultural sectors differently. Cocoa and coffee 
are produced in the rain forests of the south, and exports for cocoa have remained steady in 
spite of the conflict. But cotton and much of cereals production are in the north, in areas held 
by rebels. In the case of cotton, much production is apparently sold and ginned in 
neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso (OT Africa Line 2006), so the Ivorian cotton companies 
have been facing difficult financial times. Credit has been more difficult to obtain during this 
period as well, in part due to the conflict and in part due to structural adjustment reforms. 
Even rice is mostly produced in the north, so imports of rice to feed the urban areas of the 
south have increased markedly. “Voluntary administered prices” for rice in urban areas were 
established, but appear to help traders more than farmers, raising wholesale to retail margins 
(OECD 2006, Oryza 2004).  
The timeline of events related to agricultural policy in Cote d’Ivoire has been 
somewhat difficult to establish, mainly because there has been a consistency of policy – state 
intervention persisting – and fits and starts at liberalization followed by periods of increasing 
taxation of agriculture. Cocoa production has consistently been supported by broad policy 
initiatives, while at the same time being heavily taxed. Political events have affected policy, 
and have influenced the ways in which the state has managed its key agricultural exports. 
Structural adjustment has played the key role in fostering liberalization, but was never 
embraced by the Ivorian government. Sporadic, slow reform efforts overlap several of the 
periods identified here. Overvaluation of the CFA characterized the 1980s, and devaluation in 
1994 was a pivotal event briefly bringing faster economic growth and fewer distortions. But 
   
  
16
in periods of reform, farm-gate prices did not improve much, as private traders gained 
margins reduced by the government.  
 
 
Agricultural policies, output and trade  
 
In this section pricing and performance data will be examined by sector for the four key 
sectors which are the focus of this study – cocoa, coffee, cotton and cereals. In addition, 
critical issues relevant to each sector will be identified, and events in that sector will be 




Cocoa remains Cote d’Ivoire’s leading agricultural export, accounting for 40 percent of 
export revenue in 2002, 37 percent in 2003 and 30 percent in 2004, in spite of continued 
heavy taxation and low farm-gate prices relative to border prices. These revenue variations 
are explained by world price changes, as export volume was higher in 2004 than in the two 
previous years. Exports for Cote d’Ivoire were 41 percent of world cocoa trade in 2001 and 
35 percent in 2003, making it the world’s largest exporter and a large country exporter with 
motivation to maintain those export taxes (ICCO 2006). The most fundamental reform to 
trade policy in this sector was privatization of CAISTAB in 2000, emanating from structural 
adjustment reforms. But when export taxes were briefly lowered at the insistence of 
international donors, export trader margins increased while farm-gate prices did not and short 
run international price variability was not passed through to the farm-gate (Wilcox and 
Abbott 2004). That and the civil conflict have led to a reinstatement of export taxes. 
(Appendix Figure 6 shows the evolution of cocoa production and trade in response to these 
distorted incentives.) 
The area planted to cocoa increased steadily until the mid-1980s. While there was a 
significant rise in area planted around the 1994 devaluation, it remained flat before and 
afterwards. Yields rose erratically until 1994, and there has been a significant, steady increase 
in yields to 2004. The earlier area increases and later yield increases have allowed production 
and exports to grow, with a strong increase in output after 1994. While little of Cote 
d’Ivoire’s cocoa is consumed locally, the share of beans processed locally has increased 
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considerably since 1999, encouraged by a reduction in export taxes on processed cocoa 
products (BNETD 2002). 
High export taxes, averaging 34 percent of fob export value
5 from 1995 to 2004, 
account for much of the difference between farm-gate and border prices. (Appendix Table 2 
presents cocoa farm-gate prices as a percentage of border prices. It also shows export taxes 
since the privatization initiatives began in 1995, when excess profits to the parastatal exporter 
were replaced by explicit export taxes (the DUS and prélèvements professionnels). Export 
taxes were higher until 1998, when reform pressures were greatest, but have increased 
steadily since then to very high values. Exporter margins fell around the initial 1998-99 
liberalization, quickly recovered and then reached higher levels as the conflict intensified 
after 2002. All this came at the expense of farmers, as farm-gate prices as a share of border 
prices are in 2003 and 2004 at their lowest levels since the late 1970s, when world prices 
were much higher.  
This share of cocoa farm-gate prices was strongly influenced by the level of world 
prices as a result of CAISTAB’s stabilization efforts. Official cocoa prices in nominal terms 
would stay fixed for years prior to 1994. When adjustments were made, they typically 
reflected earlier, significant changes in the level of world prices. The result was that the 
correlation between domestic and world prices from 1979 to 1994 was only 61 percent and 
the standard deviation of farm-gate prices was only 33 percent of that for border prices 
measured in CFA. Price instability is one strong complaint of farmers in the post-
liberalization era. As is the case often of trade policy measures, these shares vary 
endogenously with world market conditions, and those changes in world prices have often 
been more important than domestic policy in determining national welfare, though less so for 
farmer welfare because of this stabilization. 
The early success of Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa sector should not be attributed to high 
farm-gate prices, which over the years of successful expansion from 1960 to 1979 averaged 
only 47 percent of border prices. Rather, institutional factors including immigration and land 
tenure policies encouraged area expansion in spite of high taxation. The devaluation did 
seemingly succeed in stimulating cocoa exports and even yield increases, but with farm-gate 
prices from 1994 to 1999 still only 45 percent of border prices. Only during the 1980-1993 
recession period were they higher, and that effect was negated when prices are measured at 
real exchange rates, so that a similar 44 percent share is then found. There have been many 
                                                 
5 The DUS (Droite unique de sortie) is a specifc tax, as are most of the prelevements professionels, but they 
have been changed often, even during seasons, in response to changing world market conditions. 
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attempts to estimate cocoa supply functions from these data (Maizels, Bacon and Mavrotas 
1997) which have been unable to obtain the correct sign on the supply elasticity, consistent 
with unmeasured institutional changes rather than higher prices driving supply trends.  
The structural adjustment reforms have brought a number of other concerns to the 
Ivorian cocoa sector, as private traders very successfully marketed cocoa, but various public 
goods provisions suffered. Complaints focused on credit availability, market information, 
input provisions and disease control. Moreover, BNETD (2006) has reported that significant 
declines in the quality of cocoa exported from Cote d’Ivoire have resulted, and that the 
premium Cote d’Ivoire received on the LIFFE commodity exchange diminished. The “laissez 
faire” regulation of private traders that had characterized CAISTAB’s parastatal management 
meant the transition for traders was easy, but there remained a need for a government agency 
in certain areas after structural adjustment reforms. New institutions were created to fill these 
gaps, but solving governance problems has not been possible with the continuing civil 
conflict. 
Another important part of the cocoa story since 1999 has been the increase in 
processing of cocoa beans into butter, powder and paste. Prior to that time, origin processing 
was small, and the products produced were considered to be of inferior quality. Both ADM 
and Cargill have built processing plants in Cote d’Ivoire meeting the output specifications of 
their European plants. Origin processing has benefited from reduced export taxes. In 1999 
export taxes on processed beans were only 9 percent, compared to 33 percent for whole 
beans. As taxes on raw beans have increased, so have taxes on cocoa processed products, but 
those taxes remained nearly 20 percent lower in 2004. Plant managers at ADM and Cargill 
argue the quality of products now coming from African plants is as good as from European 
plants, but costs are much higher. Without the export tax reduction incentives, processing 
would still be in Europe (or North America); but with these incentives, over 25 percent of 




The coffee story for Cote d’Ivoire is markedly different in some respects from the cocoa 
story. Most notably, Cote d’Ivoire was Africa’s largest coffee exporter in the 1960s to 1970s, 
but has seen declines in its very erratic production and exports. Coffee contributed from 35-
40 percent of export revenue for Cote d’Ivoire in the early 1960s, but that fell steadily to only 
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7 percent in the late 1990s and only 1.7 percent in 2004. Export taxes have not been as high 
for coffee as cocoa, in part because the fall in world coffee prices was greater. But farm-gate 
prices have remained a low share of farm-gate prices, averaging 47 percent of border prices. 
The area planted to coffee grew steadily until the mid-1980s, then leveled off, but fell 
around 1990 and declined steadily from 1999. Yield has been extremely volatile, and had 
declined considerably until 1994, when a resurgence of yields occurred. As a consequence 
production and exports rose slowly but erratically until the early 1980s, declined until the 
mid-1990s, increased considerably with the yield advances of the late 1990s, but have fallen 
back again since 2001 (Appendix Figure 7). Exports of processed coffee products have never 
been large, in contrast to the cocoa case. 
Export taxes have averaged only 8.3 percent since 1995, smaller than those for cocoa, 
while trader margins are somewhat higher, with exporter margins reaching 35 percent since 
2002 (Appendix Table 17). Farm-gate prices averaged 44 percent of border prices from 1960 
to 1979, 49 percent from 1980 to 1993, 56 percent from 1994 to 1999, and 48 percent from 
2000 to 2004. Some very low shares were realized (14 percent in 1976 and 28 percent in 
1993) and higher shares occurred in 1991 (78 percent) and 1995 (69 percent). The period of 
recession from 1980 to 1993 yielded very low relative coffee prices, averaging a 35 percent 
share of border prices, once the exchange rate overvaluation is factored in. 
International coffee prices had been higher than cocoa prices at the peak in 1975, and 
have been lower than cocoa prices since 1990 (Appendix Figure 5). These trends in border 
prices have strongly influenced domestic coffee prices, and as a share of border prices, with 
slightly less stabilization than was found for cocoa. Shares varied considerably over the rather 
stable period as a consequence of volatile international prices. Nominal coffee farm-gate 
prices never show the plateaus over several years found for cocoa, and the standard deviation 
of domestic coffee prices was 40 percent of that for border prices from 1979 to 1999. Trade 
policy for coffee also endogenously responded to border prices, raising the share of farm-gate 
prices in border prices when international coffee prices were very low.  
Structural adjustment reforms were also the driving force for recent changes in 
domestic coffee policy. A big jump in coffee farm-gate prices was seen following the 1994 
devaluation, driving area and yield expansion. But low world prices brought domestic prices 
down dramatically by 2001. The same institutional changes affecting cocoa impacted the 
coffee sector, which had also been managed by CAISTAB prior to liberalization, so many of 
the same problems arose for coffee producers. 






The cotton sector in Cote d’Ivoire has been managed somewhat differently than cocoa or 
coffee, without the “laissez faire” parastatal management. This is due to agronomic and 
institutional differences. Cotton is more input demanding, requiring fertilizer, pesticides and 
variety changes over time. Cocoa and coffee trees once planted, will produce crops with few 
inputs beyond labor. Seed cotton is also ginned in-country, and lint, cotton seed and other 
products are then sold. CIDT, a parastatal, held a monopoly in cotton until privatization 
began in 1998, when it was broken into three regional companies, but each of those held a 
monopoly over their region, and the state did not divest a majority interest in those companies 
until 2002. Liberalization advocates have not insisted on as great a degree of privatization for 
cotton, and parastatal management has extended to monopoly control of trade since the 
French colonial period (Goreux and Macrae 2003). 
Cotton farmers and cotton exports are also heavily taxed, if less so than cocoa or 
coffee farmers when ginning costs are considered, and with sustained periods of low world 
cotton prices leading to apparently higher farmgate prices as a share of border prices realized. 
(Appendix Table 18 shows cotton farm-gate prices for seed cotton, compared to the A 
(Liverpool) index, an international indicator of cotton lint prices. In that table I also compare 
cotton lint export unit values to the FAO cotton lint “producer price”
6 which show a very 
similar pattern as the seed cotton prices.) Lint and other products, not seed cotton, are 
exported. The international index of cotton lint prices is transformed to a seed cotton 
equivalent basis utilizing the methodology and ginning ratios taken from Baffes (2007). FAO 
reports cotton lint “producer prices” which are simply seed cotton producer prices converted 
to a lint basis utilizing a very similar ginning ratio (FAOSTAT 2006). Seed cotton prices 
have been a small fraction of the transformed A index, averaging 54 percent from 1966 to 
1979, 51 percent from 1980 to 1993, 51 percent from 1994 to 1999, and 63 percent from 
2000 to 2004. The extent of implicit taxation of cotton appears to be greater during the 
recession period from 1980 to 1993, when the overvaluation of the CFA is taken into 
account, since farmgate prices are then only 39 percent of border prices. 
                                                 
6 The FAO producer price for cotton lint is not a factory gate price, but rather the seed cotton producer price 
divided by a standard ginning ratio – 40 pecent until 1992 and 44 percent afterwards. Baffes (2007) ginning 
ratios show variability, but are generally similar to these estimates. 
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The cotton margins include ginning costs, but ginning is done by parastatals who were 
not privatived until 2002, and still involve some government control. Thus, taxation of cotton 
is implict in any excess profits collected by ginners, but is hard to measure because ginning 
costs appear to be reported as the difference between sales prices for lint exports and seed 
cotton costs of ginners (prices paid to farmers). Mis-management has led to losses by these 
ginners in years of very low world cotton prices. Baffes (2007) adjusts cotton margins to 
reflect excess costs of these paratsatals, and subsequent NRA calculations will reflect 
assumptions necessary to make these adjustments.  
The patterns seen here are quite similar to those for cocoa and coffee, though 
conditioned by the unique history of world cotton prices. Once again, considerable variations 
around these means are found, driven by variations in international cotton prices. Moreover, 
seed cotton prices from 1966 to 1999 are much like cocoa prices under parastatal 
management. They remained fixed in nominal terms for several years. Cotton prices, like 
cocoa prices, only increased (were never lowered) in nominal terms until 1991, and 
afterwards. Increases occurred well after international prices had increased, and the fall in 
1991 reflected a 50 percent drop in international cotton prices. Higher farmgate price shares 
in the later periods reflect persistently low world cotton prices in recent years. 
The area planted to cotton has grown steadily since 1960, with a leveling off around 
1989, a jump in area planted at the time of devaluation, and subsequent decline due to the 
civil conflict. Seed cotton yields also grew over the 1960s and 1970s, but stagnated and 
varied erratically until the devaluation, and have returned to varying around levels found in 
the mid-1980s. Production as a result grew until 1987, and again after the devaluation, with 
increased variability. Cotton lint production has mirrored seed cotton production, and most 
lint has been exported, so exports follow the same pattern. Some cottonseed has also been 
exported since 2000. (Appendix Figure 8 shows cotton production and trade since 1960.) 
These trends indicate that policies during the recession and after the devaluation hurt 
cotton exports, but that cotton has become an increasingly important export in spite of the 
sustained taxation. Recent BNETD data suggest farmers may have received somewhat better 
prices as the second phase of privatization took effect. But cotton is in the north, in territory 
held by rebels. Reports indicate that farmers have been selling cotton at lower prices for cash 
in neighboring countries rather than on credit to the financially troubled Ivorian cotton 
companies (OT Africa Line 2006). The apparent implicit taxation of cotton farmers since 
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2000 probably reflects these problems, and BNETD as well as Baffes/CIDT report that cotton 




Rice is one of Cote d’Ivoire’s most important agricultural imports, amounting to US$218 
million in 2004, or nearly 3 percent of total imports. This accounts for almost half of Cote 
d’Ivoire’s rice consumption. Cote d’Ivoire also imported $73 million worth of wheat, which 
it does not produce. This country does produce maize, millet and sorghum (as well as rice), 
but none of these other cereals are traded to any degree. According to the FAO (2003), roots 
and tubers, especially cassava, are important sources of calories in the Ivorian diets, but these 
are not traded either. Non-tradable cereals (maize, sorghum and millet) and roots and tubers 
(cassava, plantains, yams) accounted for over half of agricultural production value in the 
1960s and still over one-third of production value in recent years. As noted earlier, a 
parastatal marketing board managed rice trade until its privatization in 1995, and rice self 
sufficiency was a policy goal in the mid-1980s, supported by quantitative restrictions on 
imports. It appears that the government still influences rice prices and trade, in urban areas, 
through “voluntary” administered pricing (OECD 2006). 
Rice and maize farm-gate prices as a share of border prices are much higher than 
those typically found for exportables, but have been low over some periods, and vary with 
international price changes (Appendix Table 19). Rice farm-gate prices averaged 96 percent 
of border prices from 1961 to 1979, 121 percent from 1980 to 1993, 110 percent from 1994 
to 1999, and 125 percent from 2000 to 2003. Maize farm-gate price ratios were well above 
these ratios for rice, and those domestic prices were well above border prices for most of this 
time. Maize prices averaged 113 percent of the international (US Gulf) price from 1966 to 
1979, 174 percent from 1980 to 1993, 133 percent from 1994 to 1999 and 134 percent from 
2000 to 2004. But maize has never been traded to any significant extent, and is behaving as a 
non-tradable.
7   
Cereals tariffs are the same for all cereals, and are low, averaging 8 percent since 
privatization of the parastatal. MFN tariffs are 10 percent, and a lower ECOWAS preferential 
tariff applies to trade with neighbors. Tariffs on roots and tubers are somewhat higher (the 
                                                 
7 Both data showing very limited trade of maize and other staple home goods and the disconnection between 
domestic and world maize prices supports this assertion. 
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MFN tariff is 20 percent for cassava), but they are also not traded to a significant degree. To 
the extent there is trade in cereals other than rice or in roots and tubers, it would likely be 
with African neighbors, and statistics report trade in maize, millet, sorghum and cassava is a 
very small fraction of consumption (FAO 2003). Tariffs are inconsistent with deviations of 
rice prices from world prices in recent years, and implicit stabilization and subsidization by 
the parastatal using quantitative restrictions and market segmentation is evident in earlier 
years. High maize prices are also consistent with restrictions on cereals imports. 
Rice area planted has been relatively constant, rising in the mid-1980s when the self 
sufficiency policy applied and prices were higher, and has fallen since the devaluation of 
1994. Area planted to maize shows a similar pattern. Yields have been relatively stable, with 
dramatic increases shown in the data since 1994. These look suspiciously like data problems 
rather than actual technical improvements. (Appendix Figure 9 shows rice production and 
trade, while Appendix Figure 10 shows maize and wheat production and trade.) Diange 
(2006) and Warda (2006) report that Ivoirian farmers are adopting new rice varieties, but at a 
time much later than the yield increases shown in the FAO data. Imports of wheat and rice 
grew until the self sufficiency period, when they remained relatively constant. Wheat trade 
has been steadier, but smaller than rice, and rice imports actually declined in the mid-1980s 
after a surge. Another dramatic increase in rice imports is evident since 1999, with imports in 
2004 more than double those in the mid-1990s. There was a brief drop in rice imports around 
the time of the devaluation, which coincided with high world rice prices, but low world prices 
around 2001 and civil conflict since have brought increasing imports. 
Information on urban rice prices were obtained both from BNETD (2006) and Oryza 
(2004) for recent years. They show two characteristics of the rice market. One is that local 
rice commands a premium over imported rice. That premium was 27 percent in 2001 and 41 
percent in 2002. The second is that urban retail rice prices are substantially higher than are 
farm-gate prices or import prices, even after tariffs and the VAT are applied. In 2002, farm-
gate prices were 166 CFA per kilogram (in milled terms), import unit values were 123 CFA 
per kilogram, imported rice in the Abidjan market average 207 CFA per kilogram, and local 
rice averaged 271 CFA per kilogram according to Ozrya (2004). During this same year 
BNETD reported an urban wholesale price of 250 CFA and a retail price of 300 (reflecting 
the VAT). As noted earlier, the OECD (2006) reports that traders were asked to voluntarily 
set urban prices (probably at the BNETD reported levels). The BNETD wholesale price 
yields an urban- rural margin of 63 percent, and an import to wholesale margin of 68 percent. 
   
  
24
The rural-import price differential reflects both transportation costs and the premium on local 
rice. Taking those into account still leaves a substantial margin for urban rice traders. It 
appears the current policy restricts imports like quantitative restrictions did in the past, with 
little benefit accruing to farmers. Urban traders appear to collect any rents in this system, but 
restrictions on imports are needed to account for the import to wholesale margin, with 
segmented markets and the voluntary pricing scheme enabling collusion. 
In spite of this recent protection, rice imports have expanded greatly in recent years. 
Since most rice is grown in the north, trade within the country is severely affected by the 
ongoing civil conflict. This would help account for the large urban-rural margin, and the 
urban rice price. 
 
 
Distortions to agricultural incentives 
 
 
The main focus of the empirical part of the present study’s methodology (Anderson et al. 
2008) is on government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and 
what they would be under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the 
characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s 
methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including 
distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also generates estimates of distortions in 
non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation.
 More specifically, a Nominal Rate of 
Assistance (NRA) for producers of the main traded crops is computed. Also generated is an 
NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the 
calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA). 
Assessing the extent of “average” distortions to agriculture in Cote d’Ivoire is limited 
somewhat by the focus on the four key commodities traded by Cote d’Ivoire, which account 
for around only 40 pecent of the value of agricultural production. But these commodities are 
the ones gaining attention in policy discussions, and are important in determining the 
behavior of Cote d’Ivoire’s trade both for agriculture and in total. Data and information 
limitations prevent going far beyond these focus commodities, particularly for historical 
comparisons. Strong assumptions must be invoked to compute average protection rates for 
even these four traded products in Cote d’Ivoire. There are, however, three important 
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nontradable staple food products (cassava, plantains and yams), whose markets are not 
directly distorted by government price or trade policies, that we include; they raise the 
product coverage ratio to between 70 and 80 percent.  
For the three exportables focused on here, farm-gate prices are a small share of world 
prices. Cocoa and coffee shares were at 50-55 percent and cotton was 57 percent in 2001. 
These fell to about 36 percent for cocoa and coffee, and increased to 61 percent for cotton in 
2004. Explicit export taxes explain these low farm-gate prices for cocoa. High trader margins 
and excess profits for coffee and cotton suggest an effective non-tariff barrier (NTB) or 
imperfectly competitive traders. The war has increased domestic trader margins for cocoa as 
well. In the case of cotton, privatization appears to have briefly raised the share of the border 
price going to farmers, and the effective NTB had fallen, but after privatization margins 
remain high. A very small explicit export tax (prélèvement professionel) was recently added 
for cotton, but it is not big enough to affect these results, and explicit export taxes have not 
been found for other exportables.
8  
Import-competing products considered here included rice and wheat. Cote d’Ivoire 
produces no wheat, but rice production is important, and similar tariffs apply. Both are 
subject to a 10 percent MFN tariff and the VAT, which was 18 percent in 2004 and 20 
percent in 2001. Producer price data reveal protection to rice, but wholesale to retail margins 
are larger and suggest quantitative restrictions may still apply, benefiting local traders more 
so than farmers.
9  
Other cereals produced in Cote d’Ivoire include maize, millet and sorghum. Roots and 
tubers, especially yams and cassava, also make up a substantial part of diets. Tariffs on other 
cereals are the same as for rice and wheat, whereas tariffs on roots and tubers are higher, near 
the level of other agricultural products. Trade data for West Africa suggest these products and 
plantains are non-tradable in this region, however, so those tariffs are redundant and the NRA 
for cassava, plantains and yams is thus assumed to be zero. For those products, both import 
and export volumes are very low and erratic, as are trade unit values. Maize farm-gate prices 
                                                 
8 Data reported for bananas reveal low farm-gate prices relative to border prices, suggesting an NTB or high 
margins, as in the case of cotton. In the case of palm oil, farm-gate prices are higher, indicating little 
intervention. Both bananas and palm oil are produced on plantations which were to be privatized in 2002, but 
this has resulted in little change in the share of the world price accruing to farmers. 
9 Fruits and vegetables and other agricultural products are now typically charged a 20 percent MFN tariff. The 
average tariff for fruits and vegetables was somewhat higher in 2001, and somewhat lower for agricultural 
products overall. These current tariffs are similar to the protection afforded to manufactured goods, where the 20 
percent MFN tariff and 18 percent VAT generally apply. There are exceptions to all these MFN tariffs for 
special cases, however. 
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are substantially higher than international prices, more so than can be accounted for by the 
tariffs, suggesting that rural cereals prices depend to some extent on domestic market 
conditions, and may be influenced also by the quantitative restrictions on rice imports. 
Table 1 presents the evolution of the nominal rates of assistance (NRA) for cocoa, 
coffee, cotton and rice from 1961 to 2005, while Figure 2 shows averages NRAs for 
exportables and the one importable. Average NRAs are -43 percent for cocoa, -55 percent for 
coffee and -31 percent for cotton, showing heavy taxation of export agriculture. The NRA for 
rice imports averaged close to zero over the whole period, but was 24 percent during the most 
recent period shown (2000-05).  
These estimates appear to show a great deal of variability over time in agricultural 
protection (or rather taxation, since these are negative in most cases). NRAs are higher, and 
taxation of agriculture is lower, in years when commodity prices are low, and they are lower 
at times of high commodity prices. This reflects the stabilization goals of parastatal 
management, which has only recently been eliminated, by more serious structural adjustment 
reforms, from the policy regimes applied to these crops.  
When we discussed the individual crop histories above, we saw much greater 
similarity in the average extent of taxation during the critical political-economic periods 
identified earlier. In large part this is because each period witnessed both low and higher 
international prices. The transition from one period to the next (e.g. the beginning of the 
protracted recession) was often brought about by a sustained change in the relative level of 
the key international commodity prices. (In Appendix Figure 5 we also saw that these 
international prices tended to move together, if imperfectly, with peaks (mid-1970s, mid-
1990s) and valleys (around 2000, mid-1980s) occurring simultaneously.) A key point is that 
border policy and domestic agricultural policy in Cote d’Ivoire have endogenously responded 
to world market conditions, isolating to some extent farmers from those extremes, but 
continuing to tax farmers in most years, and especially when world prices are high.  
Also included among the covered products are the three key nontraded staples, 
namely cassava, plantains and yams, but their NRAs are assumed to be zero so their inclusion 
simply lowers the weighted average NRA for our group of covered farm products (which 
account for 70-80 percent of agricultural output valued at undistorted prices). The NRA for 
the whole sector is generated after making assumptions about the NRA for the exportable, 
import-competing and nontradable parts of non-covered farm products and of their shares in 
the value of non-covered production. Those NRAs are shown in the top rows of Table 2. The 
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NRA for just tradable farm products is then compared with that for non-agricultural tradables 
using the relative rate of assistance (RRA), shown in the lower part of Table 2 and illustrated 
in Figure 3. What those RRAs suggest is that the prices of tradable farm products, relative to 
those received by producers of non-farm tadables, has been depressed by between one-third 






Cote d’Ivoire is an export oriented agricultural economy, dominated by the export of cocoa. It 
has managed to maintain and grow exports of its leading export in spite of heavy taxation. 
Historically, taxes have been somewhat lower on cocoa than on some other key agricultural 
exports, but those taxes have been quite high, nevertheless. From 1961 to 2004 the nominal 
rate of assistance (NRA) applied to cocoa showed an average effective 44 percent taxation of 
this crop, compared with average taxes on coffee of 55 percent over this period and on cotton 
of 29 percent. Cocoa exports expanded such that Cote d’Ivoire for many years now has been 
the world’s largest exporter of cocoa. Coffee exports in the face of these incentives have 
diminished substantially, but cotton has expanded in spite of the high rate of taxation. 
Explaining these trends in the light of incentives is problematic. Only coffee seems to behave 
according to our simple price-driven supply models, and other explanations beyond simply 
price incentives are required to explain increasing production in the face of heavy taxation. 
The NRA for rice production, a key agricultural import, has averaged 1.3 percent 
since 1961, and is now much higher (26 percent). In spite of quantitative restrictions in the 
past, rice imports have grown, and have grown rapidly even as the protection has risen 
recently. It is interesting to note that virtually all analysts have described policy in Cote 
d’Ivoire as focusing on agricultural exports, and on discouraging food production, yet rice is 
protected, and prices for other cereals, which are largely non-tradable, also have been 
generally higher than international norms (perhaps buoyed by the high rice price and import 
limitations). 
Taxation of agriculture appears to be remarkably stable over the critical political-
economic periods defined according to Ivorian history, hiding significant year-to-year 
variations. In each of the four periods, averages of the NRAs are very close to the overall 
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average, and the extent of taxation since 1980 is very close to the average before 1980. In the 
case of cocoa, taxes averaged 43 percent before 1980, and 44 percent afterwards. In the case 
of coffee, taxes averaged 55 percent in each of those periods, and in cotton the rate was about 
30 percent in both periods. The change has been greatest for rice, where effective tariffs were 
-1 percent from 1960 to 1979 and 24 percent afterwards. This stability, in spite of the large 
variations in yearly taxation rates, reflects the stabilization objective of Ivorian agricultural 
policy, and the endogeneity of agricultural taxation. Very high tax rates have been lowered in 
years of low international prices, sheltering farmers from the full effects of international price 
volatility, but taxing them nevertheless. 
One of the main forces for change of Cote d’Ivoire’s agricultural policy has been 
structural adjustment reforms. These have included pressure to reduce export taxes and to 
privatize parastatal agencies that have managed the key agricultural sectors. The government 
of Cote d’Ivoire in the past has not taken ownership of these reforms, and since the first 
reforms began in 1981 trade liberalization efforts have begun and stalled and then begun 
again. More recent efforts, since the 1994 devaluation and particularly after 2000 when 
CAISTAB was finally privatized, might have finally been effective in making this a more 
open, market-oriented economy, but the recent civil conflict has put reduced agricultural 
taxation on hold.  
It is not entirely evident that these reforms are always in the national interest. Farmers 
have objected to the price variability they now face. More importantly, as a large country 
exporter it may be that export taxes are in the national interest, even if not in farmers’ 
interests. Yilmaz (1999) a decade ago estimated that optimal export taxes for cocoa from 
Cote d’Ivoire were around 30 percent, only somewhat lower than the historical rate of 
taxation. Others have shown that quotas, and parastal management, can also exploit Cote 
d’Ivoire’s market power in cocoa (Panagariya and Schiff 1992). Tax revenues were intended 
to help stabilize prices, but were more often used to finance diversification of exports and 
industrial development. Gilbert and Varangis (2003) argue in the case of cocoa that if 
structural adjustment raised farm-gate prices for all the African exporters, supply expansion 
could have frustrated the intent of this initiative to improve farmer welfare by lowering world 
prices. Abbott, Wilcox and Muir (2005) note that imperfectly competitive private traders 
have at times raised margins when structural adjustment reduced taxation, and those margins 
fell again as taxes were subsequently raised. In neighboring countries, where reforms have 
gone further, farm-gate prices remain a fraction of world prices, and imperfectly competitive 
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behavior by traders is found, resulting in weak transmission to farmers of world price 
fluctuations. The share of farmgate prices in consumer goods prices is notoriously small, and 
large multinationals who may have market power intervene between consumers and cocoa 
farmers (Dorin 2003, Fold 2002, Losch 2002). Thus, the effects of the longstanding structural 
adjustment reforms in Cote d’Ivoire, even in the brief periods when they were more seriously 
applied, have not led to significantly higher farm-gate prices. 
Early analysts emphasized the institutional structure of markets and policy in Cote 
d’Ivoire. Immigration and land tenure policies were important, at least before 1994, in 
explaining supply response and expansion of cocoa exports. The “laissez faire” parastatal 
management of cocoa and coffee interfered little with cocoa production beyond the collection 
of taxes at the port. Lessons after privatization of cocoa and coffee have been that the private 
sector can continue to market cocoa effectively, that taxes are not necessarily reduced, and 
that a role for government remains. Farmers’ complaints about prices reflect as much the 
problems of poor market information when pan-territorial, stable prices no longer apply. 
Quality deterioration, credit availability, ineffective disease and pest management, and the 
need for research and extension show that some government involvement must persist, and 
each of these aspects had been addressed by policy prior to 2000. Newly invented “private” 
institutions have attempted to cope with some of these problems in a difficult political 
environment. 
One must be careful in advocating simplistic policy solutions for Cote d’Ivoire’s 
agricultural sector. WTO-style trade liberalization, if it involves only tariff changes, is 
unlikely to have a large effect. It is difficult to find any effect of the 1995 Uruguay Round 
Agreement (FAO 2003), in part because structural adjustment not WTO commitments 
dictated any actual reforms, and in part because it occurred at the same time as the 1994 
devaluation. But institutionally set prices changed only slowly in response to these forces. 
That sectors improved even in cases where positive changes in farm-gate prices are not 
immediately evident demonstrates the importance of accompanying institutional changes. 
The most powerful political economy factor dictating policy and performance in 
Ivorian agriculture has been civil conflict. This has influenced the specifics of agricultural 
policy through the north-south division of the country and through impacts on immigrant 
labor. It has frustrated the intent of recent, more serious liberalization efforts. It is unfair to 
judge the potential of greater agricultural liberalization until those problems are solved. But 
both the successes and the problems of agricultural exports in Cote d’Ivoire highlight the 
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Figure 1: Product composition of agricultural production, Cote D’Ivoire, 1961 to 2005 
 







































Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all
a agricultural 
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Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing averages 
because assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included. 






Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
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Source: Author’s spreadsheet 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively.  
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Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, Cote D’Ivoire, 1961 to 2005 
(percent) 
    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
           
Exportables 
a -46.5 -50.4 -48.6 -58.6 -59.8 -43.4 -47.4 -39.4 -47.1 
Cocoa  -33.3 -45.4 -40.4 -50.2 -51.9 -37.1 -44.1 -41.1 -49.4 
Coffee  -51.6 -52.2 -52.6 -64.0 -69.9 -57.6 -57.9 -39.1 -48.0 
Cotton  na -20.6 -29.2 -24.9 -46.9 -34.9 -38.4 -21.9 -15.0 
            
Import-competing products 
a -22.3 -37.4  12.2  41.0 -17.8  8.4  -5.4  7.2  23.6 
Rice  -22.3 -37.4  12.2  41.0 -17.8  8.4  -5.4  7.2  23.6 
           
Nontradables  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cassava  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Plantains  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Yams  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
           
Total of covered products 
a -28.6 -35.4 -32.7 -39.8 -40.1 -28.5 -21.7 -22.5 -28.7 
Dispersion of covered products 
b    22.9 27.5 33.1 46.2 33.3 33.1 26.2 23.4 32.6 
%  coverage  (at  undistorted  prices)  75 75 76 75 75 80 76 71 72 
Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.  









    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
Covered  products  -28.6 -35.4 -32.7 -39.8 -40.1 -28.5 -21.7 -22.5 -28.7 
Non-covered  products    -8.5 -11.2 -13.7  -2.5  -8.9  -8.5 -12.2 -14.3 -16.3 
All  agricultural  products  -23.5 -29.3 -28.1 -30.8 -32.2 -24.3 -19.5 -20.0 -25.2 
Trade bias index
a -0.53 -0.50 -0.55 -0.70 -0.64 -0.54 -0.55 -0.49 -0.55 
 
Assistance to just tradables: 
      All  agricultural  tradables  -32.9 -38.1 -35.0 -38.6 -42.9 -33.3 -32.7 -27.5 -33.7 
   All non-agricultural tradables  15.9  11.7  9.6  20.2  14.7  17.2  11.2  7.5  4.3 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
b -42.1 -44.6 -40.7 -48.7 -50.2 -43.1 -39.5 -32.6 -36.5 
 
Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
a. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 
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Appendix: Data, data sources, and assumptions 
 
 
Data for this study were collected on supply and utilization (area, yield, production, exports, 
imports, domestic use and processing), on pricing (at the farm-gate, at wholesale markets and at the 
border), and on explicit border policy measures (export taxes and tariffs). Historical data were 
available from FAOSTAT (2006). More recent data, which also allowed estimation of wholesale 
and exporter margins, were available from BNETD (Bureau National d' Etudes Techniques et de 
Développement 2006), the former planning ministry and now public “think tank” examining 
agricultural policy. Cotton data were taken from the study by Baffes (2007), which obtained 
information from the cotton compamies in Cote d’Ivoire and elsewhere. Data on broader economic 
performance and trade, particularly in value terms, came from International Financial Statistics 
(IMF 2006) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006).  
Comparisons of data sources reveal both inconsistencies and certain regularities. Prices are 
harder to find than quantity data. During periods of parastatal management, prices were regulated or 
administered on a pan-territorial basis for most important commodities. During those periods, 
reported prices were official prices, and were better data that did not conflict among sources. If 
black markets violated these administered prices, that outcome is simply not reflected in any 
available data. In private markets prices vary over time, space, quality and even institutions 
governing transactions. The notion of “a farm-gate price” becomes less meaningful under these 
conditions, but indicators of the level of average prices can be collected. Surveys must be employed 
to gather price information, and terms for transactions (e.g. quality definitions) must be defined. 
This has been done in Cote d’Ivoire by both BNETD and the BCC for cocoa, and to a lesser extent 
coffee. Differences among reported prices show up during these periods, and the nationally 
collected prices seemed to yield the most consistent trader margins.  
In general, for more recent periods national price data from BNETD has been used to assess 
distortions to agricultural incentives, whereas FAOSTAT data was used for earlier periods as well 
as for quantity data. Specific issues related to the different types of data collected are discussed 
below:  
 
Supply-utilization data and processing 
 
None of the national statistics I found were better than or inconsistent with the FAOSTAT (2006) 
data. FAO supply-utilization data for these commodities are provided in Appendix Tables 7-11. 
These data include exports of processed products – cocoa butter, powder and paste. It is not clear 
whether crushing cocoa beans to obtain cocoa butter, powder and past is “light processing,” a term 
used in the overall World Bank study. It is however an important part of this story, as Cote d’Ivoire 
has reduced export taxes on processed beans, and so the major processors (ADM, Cargill, etc.) have 
built plants and exported cocoa products at those reduced export taxes. Plant managers 
10 stated 
they would not process or export locally without the reduced export taxes. 
  Computation of nominal rates of assistance also required value share data for tradeables and 
home goods. Detailed agricultural production values at farmgate prices were downloaded from 
FAOSTAT (2006) and the FAO supply utilization data was used to assign commodities to exports, 
imports or home goods. These data were also used to compute the share of covered products (cocoa, 
 





coffee, cotton, rice, yams, plantains and cassava) in overall agricultural production, valued at 
farmgate prices and at undistorted prices – corrected by the NRAs estimated here. The traded 
products accounted for about a third of agriculture from 1961 to 2004, rising to 40 percent when the 
extent of export taxation is considered, and to 70 percent when non-tradable roots and tubers are 
included.  
 
Farm-gate and reference (border) prices 
 
BNETD (formerly the Planning Ministry, now a public “think tank”) runs surveys and publishes 
farm-gate prices in recent years (since 1995 for cocoa and 2000 for some other crops), and also 
reports export prices. These are consistent for cocoa and coffee with BCC (2006) (Bourse du Café 
et du Cacao – a new quasi private coffee and cocoa exchange) surveys, newspaper reports, etc. They 
also give more consistent and reasonable trader margins than do recent FAO data in those cases. 
The FAO data seem to miss the effects of civil conflict and reduced farm-gate prices through 
greater export taxes. Earlier FAO price data, overlapping BCC and BNETD data in years when 
CAISTAB, the parastatal, managed exports are consistent. (This is not surprising since CAISTAB 
implemented pan-territorial, administered pricing.) The discrepancies in FAO price data were never 
large until very recently, but do result in smaller trader margins. 
  Cotton farmgate prices were also collected by Baffes (2007) from CIDT. Those prices were 
much lower than prices obtained from BNETD, and tell a qualitatively different story about recent 
taxation of cotton in Cote d’Ivoire. Since the BNETD prices seem implausibly high, and were 
unlikely to have actually been paid to farmers (OT Africa Line 2006), the Baffes/ CIDT data is used 
in computing NRAs. But this discrepancany, which relates to problems arising from the civil 
conflict, is noted.     
The ICCO (Cocoa) and ICO (Coffee) report international price indices comparable to the 
cotton A-Index used by Baffes (2007) in his study of distortions in West African cotton sectors. 
These give a better indication of reference (border) prices and so trader margins in earlier years 
when BNETD data is unavailable. These prices indices are reported in appendix table A5. 
Farm-gate price data are based on BNETD data (when available) for cocoa and coffee, 
Baffes/ CIDT data for cotton, and FAO data for rice and for earlier periods. Reference (border 
prices) are BNETD data where available and the international (ICCO, ICO, A) indices in earlier 
years. Margins for traders in periods when parastatals were in effect are assumed constant, at levels 
computed from the BNETD data during periods prior to privatization of a sectors parastatal. 
BNETD data is used to compute margins in each year after liberalization when available. The recent 
Baffes’ data (2007) also includes margins for cotton as well as ginning costs. Since ginning costs 
appear to have been computed from the difference between lint border prices and seedcotton 
farmgate prices, those costs were adjusted by Baffes to reflect the implicit taxation of farmers by 
cottton parastatal ginning companies. Price data and margins used later to compute shares of border 
prices and other distortion measures are provided in Appendix Tables 12-15 for these commodities. 
 
Export taxes and import tariffs 
 
BNETD reports export taxes for coffee, cocoa and cotton. These include both the basic tax (DUS – 
Droite Unique de Sortie) and fees to support “private associations” such as the BCC, called 
“Prélèvements professionnels”. The cotton export tax is only the “prélèvement professionnel”, and 
only exists after 2004. It is likely that Cote d’Ivoire has used these professional fees, or will do so in 





No one states that there were any export taxes, except those found for cocoa, coffee and 
cotton (BNETD 2006 and earlier years; FAO 2003). But it is likely that parastatals collected 
“excess profits” from other agricultural export sectors before privatization, and “quasi private” 
exporters may continue to do so. I estimate those profits in a few cases based on the ratio of farm-
gate to reference prices, assuming trader margins (20 percent) comparable to those observed for 
cocoa and coffee. In the case of cotton, I use Baffes (2007) adjustment of ginning costs. I use 
BNETD-reported export taxes where available, and impute export NTBs based on guessed trader 
margins and observed farm-gate to border price ratios, to account for parastatal excess profits. I also 
assume that taxation of other uncovered exportables is on average comparable to cocoa, coffee and 
cotton taxation, given the similar trends for the covered exportables and the extent of apparent 
taxation comparing recent farmgate and export prices for palm oil, bananas and rubber. In these 
cases the mechanism of farmer taxation is different since these are produced on (often government 
owned) plantations.  
FAO (2003) in a case study of implementation of the URAA by Cote d’Ivoire reports 
average applied import tariffs for some agricultural goods. UNCTAD Trains (2006) reports current 
(2006) MFN tariffs. The WTO (1995) reported tariffs at the last trade policy review for Cote 
d’Ivoire in 1995. World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006b) reports average tariffs 
(computed from revenue) for 1991 to 2004.  Data on industrial tariffs from 1961 to 1981 is also 
available from Krueguer, Schiff and Valdes (1991). The tariff scheme in Cote d’Ivoire appears to be 
relatively simple now. Cereals are charged a 10 percent MFN tariff, and most other agricultural 
products a 20 percent MFN tariff. This scheme of tariffs at 20 percent except for special cases 
where lower tariffs apply was in place in 1995, and applies also to manufactured goods. Cote 
d’Ivoire is a member of ECOWAS, where a lower CET applies – so the FAO study computes 
average tariffs which are lower than current MFN tariffs due to the lower preferential ECOWAS 
tariffs, but the author suggests that the ECOWAS CET appears to be violated in some cases.  
Historical data on tariffs in Cote d’Ivoire appears to be very poor. For example, World 
Development Indicators reports tariff revenue only for a limited number of years. Tariffs were less 
relevant, and endogenous quantitative restrictions were applied when parastatals managed imports, 
as in the rice case. Numerous authors describe variations in market access to Cote d’Ivoire, 
particularly over the structural adjustment/ recession period, without citing numbers (Kouassy, 
Pegatienan and Ngaladjo 2004). I use FAO (2003) tariffs as an estimate for 2001, and UNCTAD 
Trains MFN tariffs for 2004 for specific agricultural products. I use World Bank (2006b) and 
Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1991) for industiral tariffs, extrapolating data for the 1980s from trends 
described in Kouassy, Pegatienan and Ngaladjo (2004). I assume that tariffs for agricultural imports 
other than rice are the same as those for industrial tariffs, since only rice imports appear to have 
been treated exceptionally. 
     
Consumer taxes 
 
Cote d’Ivoire now applies a somewhat uniform value added tax (VAT). In 1995 the VAT averaged 
17.5 percent and varied across goods, with the highest rate and the one applying to most goods at 20 
percent (WTO 1995). Evidently it was lowered as part of the post-devaluation reforms. The VAT 
was raised in 2001 to 20 percent, and then lowered to 18 percent in 2003 (World Bank 2006b, 
OECD 2006). The VAT in principle applies to imports as well as domestic production. It is unlikely 
that the VAT is collected on all cereals sales, especially in rural areas. It is likely that lower rates for 








Only FAO data on producer prices and export unit values are available for rice. Much of Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports are Thai broken rice, and an index of that price is available from the IMF (2006). 
FAO unit import values and Thai broken rice prices are similar. I use the Thai broken rice price as 
my reference price. FAO producer prices are of a similar magnitude or higher than Thai broken rice 
prices, when farmgate prices are converted from paddy to milled equivalent terms. It would appear 
that the small import tariff is the only protection now afforded rice producers, but voluntary 
adminsitered prices continue the tradition of quantitative restriction on imports. 
BNETD reports (only) market prices for rice (in Abidjan), and they are much higher than 
farm-gate prices. The Oryza Market Reports (2004, 2003, 2002, 2001 and 2000) indicate urban 
market prices that are similar to those reported by BNETD, and also report a substantial premium to 
local rice over imported rice, around 25 percent in 2000 and 2001. The retail margin for rice seems 
large, even taking into account the VAT. The OECD (2006) reports that Cote d’Ivoire instituted 
“voluntary” administered prices for rice in 2002. Cote d’Ivoire historically applied quantitative 
restrictions on rice and other food imports, especially before privatization of parastatals. The high 
retail margins suggest that either quantitative margins persist, or that “voluntary” price controls 
raise urban market prices and limit imports.  
I use FAO producer prices for rice farm-gate prices and the IMF Thai broken rice price as a 
reference (border) price for rice. The voluntary administered pricing regime is best modeled as an 
additional consumer tax, beyond the VAT, but both only apply in urban areas. This effect is not 
captured in the study methodology (Anderson, Martin, Sandri and Valenzuela 2008), and illustrates 




Appendix Table 20 includes several additional commodities important to trade, and for which 
recent data is available. Tariff data are from two different sources: the 2004 data is MFN tariffs 
from UNCTAD (TRAINS); the 2001 data is for average applied tariffs from FAO (2003), reflecting 
trade under the ECOWAS preferential tariff scheme, accounting for some of the differences 
between 2001 and 2004. International commodity prices in virtually all of these cases were higher, 
and sometimes by quite a bit, in 2004 over 2001. Since protection in Cote d’Ivoire varies 
endogenously with the level of world prices, some of the differences in these measures are due to 
those changes in world prices. In the case of exports, civil conflict and the need to generate public 




Roots and tubers (cassava, plantains and yams) and coarse grains (maize, sorghum and millet) 
appear to act like non-tradeables. Reported trade was a very small fraction of consumption. 
Producer prices are well above reference border prices (e.g. the US Gulf price for maize), but there 
is no evident policy to support cereals production beyond limits on rice imports. Policies tend to 
discriminate against food production in favor of exports. Import tariffs are somewhat higher for 
roots and tubers than for cereals, but imports are minimal and unit values are quite erratic and often 
unreasonably high. If there were to be trade among coarse grains or cassava, it would likely be with 
neighboring West African countries where the lower ECOWAS CET would apply, but smuggling 






Input and production subsidies 
 
Especially in cotton, and in cocoa and coffee, parastatals or publicly (partially) owned companies 
sold inputs (fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, and herbicides) to farmers, possibly at subsidized 
prices. Input subsidies, credit and sales were tied together by these institutional relationships. After 
liberalization, relationships with traders often incorporated these same dimensions. In cotton, input 
use is critical. In cocoa and coffee, it has been written that input use was quite small (Widner 1993), 
but Ahmed, Kazianga and Sanders (2005) argue that some of the recent success of Ivorian cocoa is 
due to use of fertilizer. Use of fungicides, especially in cocoa, had a strong public goods externality 
aspect, as diseases need to be controlled on a limited number of farms to prevent them from 
spreading widely. It also appears to have been the case that parastatals invested in infrastructure in 
regions where crops were grown. No data was found to estimate the quantitative magnitude of these 
subsidies. 
“Prélèvements professionnels” collected as export taxes are also used to support public and 
quasi private institutions in the cocoa, coffee and now cotton sectors. Credit subsidies to 
cooperatives are funded by this mechanism, though many have been highly critical of some of these 
institutions, and repayments of loans by cooperatives are very low.  
I treat production subsidies as zero, but doubt this is accurate. These subsidies are likely to 
offset, though only partially, the heavy taxation of agricultural exports from Cote d’Ivoire. In the 
following sections I use this information to examine historical trends in prices and performance and 
the extent of distortions to agricultural incentives for the four key agricultural commodities. 
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Appendix Figure 2: Commodity shares


































*in value, including processed products. 
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Appendix Figure 3: Commodity shares


































*in value, including processed products
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
CPI Official rate Parallel rate (Easterly) based on REER
 
 
* in CFA per $ 
** Index, 2000 equals 100
   
  
6
Appendix Figure 5: Commodity prices
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*   in $ per metric ton 
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Yield Production Exports- bean equivalent Exports - raw beans Area
 
 
*Area in million hectares, yield in kilograms per hectare and quantities in 1000 metric tons. 
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Yield Production Exports- Beans, green Exports - preparations Area
 
 
*Area in million hectares, yield in kilograms per hectare and quantities in 1000 metric tons. 
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Production - Seed Cotton Production - Lint Exports - Lint
Exports - Cottonseed Area Yield
 
 
*Area in million hectares, yield in metric tons per hectare and quantities in 1000 metric tons. 
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Production - Paddy Imports Milled Imports Broken
Imports Husked Area Yield
 
 
*Area in million hectares, yield in metric tons per hectare and quantities in 1000 metric tons. 
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Production  Maize Net Imports Maize Imports Wheat Area- Maize Yield - Maize
 
 
*Area in million hectares, yield in metric tons per hectare and quantities in 1000 metric tons. 
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Farmgate Price  using REER
Export Tax  on processed beans
Exporter margin Wholesale margin
Consumer VAT
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Farmgate Price  using REER Export Tax
Exporter margin Wholesale margin Consumer VAT
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Farmgate Price - Seed Cotton using REER Lint Price Export tax
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Farmgate Price - Rice  using REER
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Appendix Table 1: Timeline of political and economic events important to agricultural 
policy and macroeconomic performance, Cote d’Ivoire, 1958 to 2005 
 
Year                  Event_________________________________________ 
1958    Became an autonomous republic within French community 
1960    Full independence from France 
5    Oil and World Food Crises – Commodity prices surge 
   ECOWAS  created 
1    First Structural Adjustment Reforms begin 
9    Reversal of liberalization measures 
0   Multi-party  system  introduced 
3    Houphouet Boigny, President since independence, died 
4    Devaluation of CFA 
5    Rice parastatal privatized 
    Commodity prices surge again 
8    CIDT (Cotton parastatal) begins privatization,  
    loses monopoly as three regional compamies created 
9    Civil conflict begins with Cote d’Ivoire’s first coup d’etat 
    Economy in decline, low commodity prices again 
0    CAISTAB replaced (Coocoa and Coffee parastatal privatized) 
    BCC, ARCC, etc (Cocoa professional associations) created 
    SOFICOCI (Cotton financing institution) created 
1    VAT on food increased from 11.1 percent to 20 percent 
2   “Voluntary”  price  controls on retail rice prices 
    Failed coup d’etat, Rebel uprising, country split between north and south 
   Disvestiture  of  CIDT  and Ivoire Cotton by government 
    Divestiture by govt of sugar, rubber, palm oil and pineapple plantations 
    Middlemen in north sell cotton to Mali and Burkina Faso 
3  Linas-Marcoussis Accord 
  VAT reduced from 20 percent to 18 percent 
4  Mass exodous of migrant workers from south  
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Appendix Table 2: Macroeconomic performance of Cote d'Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in billion  constant  Growth rate  constant  constant PPP 
in billion 
CFA (2000) CFA %/year (2000) $ $
196 152 1563 9.93 595











































196 158 1583 1.23
196 186 1812 14.49
196 226 2131 17.61 726
1965 225 2065
1966 252 2304
196 266 2410 4.60 726
196 317 2712 12.55 782
196 354 2971 9.54
1970 402 3279 10.38
1971 436 3589 9.46
197 466 3741 4.24 909
197 559 3963 5.94 923
197 739 4135
1975 835 4476 8.25
197 1114 5054 12
1539 5424 7.31
1783 6016 10.91
197 1945 6160 2.39 1088
2150 5485 -10.96 924 2289
2291 5677 3.50 911 2292
198 2487 5688 0.20 871 2212
198 2606 5466 -3.90 798 2094
2990 5319 -2.70 743 1
1985 3135 5558 4.50 743 1944
198 3172 5739 3.26 737 1880
3032 5719 -0.35 706 1829
3054 5784 1.14 689 1790
3113 5955 2.95 684 1881
1990 2939 5889 -1.10 654 1807
199 2960 5892 0.04 633 1717
1992 2952 5877 -0.24 611
1993 3128 5866 -0.19 592
4616 5914 0.81 579 1508
5491 6335 7.13 603 1563
1996 6210 6825 7.73 632 1612
6842 7215 5.72 650 1634
7541 7558 4.75 664 1664
7731 7678 1.58 658 1661
7423 7421 -3.35 623 1576
2001 7737 7428 0.
8003 7307 -1.63 592
7982 7186 -1.66 573
2004 8175 7304 1.64 574
Source: W ank, World Development Indicat  
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Appendix Table 3: Exports by Cote d'Ivoire in $ millions, 1961 to 2004 
Total Agriculture Cocoa Coffee Cotton Rubber Bananas Pineapples Palm oil Cashew
1961 218 134 40 82 0 0 7 3 2 0
1962 222 136 43 78 0 0 8 3 1 0
1963 258 171 46 100 0 0 14 4 1 0
1964 331 217 59 130 0 0 13 6 2 0
1965 336 187 49 106 1 1 11 6 2 0
1966 371 217 61 124 2 3 11 8 1 0
1967 391 209 67 106 5 2 10 10 2 0
1968 523 288 97 149 7 3 13 11 2 0
1969 501 287 123 122 7 3 12 11 2 0
1970 518 330 118 162 7 4 13 14 5 0
1971 507 332 117 158 7 4 11 16 9 0
1972 619 334 111 149 12 4 14 24 11 0
1973 898 467 154 204 17 9 14 32 19 0
1974 1404 791 315 275 26 11 15 43 80 0
1975 1430 756 295 298 20 8 14 46 54 0
1976 1946 1125 390 567 26 12 13 46 38 0
1977 2671 1551 559 818 26 13 13 45 48 0
1978 2886 1759 912 611 42 16 18 61 57 0
1979 3164 1762 704 815 52 21 17 58 44 0
1980 3561 1981 943 687 74 28 50 66 67 0
1981 2966 1693 874 486 71 23 29 71 46 0
1982 2756 1412 621 507 59 21 19 49 36 0
1983 2527 1280 543 452 89 28 15 35 33 0
1984 3100 1868 1,083 457 83 35 16 48 59 0
1985 3264 2139 1,105 670 80 31 33 70 45 1
1986 3617 2409 1,340 734 86 39 29 77 33 3
1987 3372 2055 1,236 454 88 54 25 69 40 4
1988 3127 1734 838 491 147 67 21 55 50 1
1989 3126 1806 1,162 301 122 57 21 39 38 5
1990 3421 1613 874 300 168 59 27 47 64 4
1991 3149 1531 854 246 155 52 36 46 66 4
1992 3559 1433 798 229 117 61 43 46 75 5
1993 3252 1606 923 220 141 52 65 41 85 7
1994 3369 1558 889 209 144 68 59 37 71 6
1995 4594 2179 1,213 399 142 112 81 44 89 19
1996 4989 2445 1,587 272 119 121 87 59 71 7
1997 4855 2437 1,490 375 138 100 69 53 54 19
1998 5038 2647 1,651 398 175 75 69 40 79 19
1999 5067 2441 1,581 209 154 68 77 57 79 61
2000 4211 1916 1,034 303 155 78 68 48 41 43
2001 4357 2033 1,308 142 129 70 70 46 39 37
2002 5695 3012 2,309 120 139 87 74 45 39 50
2003 6280 3216 2,361 142 183 122 88 52 56 38
2004 7445 3178 2,229 129 171 154 170 117 20 71
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators and FAOSTAT
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Appendix Table 4: Imports by Cote d'Ivoire in $ millions, 1961 to 2004 







1961 174 38 32 41113 1
1962 166 45 29 61113 1
1963 179 42 35 45113 1
1964 228 54 44 86114 1
1965 275 62 52 95115 2
1966 292 66 56 1 39125 2
1967 311 58 47 45226 2
1968 360 64 53 86226 2
1969 369 67 57 75227 2
1970 422 82 70 78229 3
1971 447 91 77 8322 1 1 2
1972 536 106 91 9722 1 0 3
1973 834 165 143 3 9 1 343 1 5 4
1974 1179 176 148 3 4 1 064 2 1 5
1975 1425 172 138 1 1 379 2 0 7
1976 1690 176 139 22 1 81 42 8 9
1977 2276 260 212 35 25 11 19 39 9 18
1978 2958 316 262 42 30 13 27 53 12 20
1979 3443 367 310 64 30 15 27 60 11 22
1980 4190 486 419 1 1 54 62 42 87 2 1 3
1981 3566 492 429 1 2 94 11 92 57 8 1 7
1982 2976 412 358 1 0 53 41 32 75 9 1 5
1983 2443 386 340 94 38 12 16 51 15 21
1984 2175 360 318 7 93 6 91 04 2 1 6
1985 2261 341 290 6 03 7 91 35 3 1 5
1986 2764 390 332 81 41 13 23 70 23 23
1987 2988 454 393 1 0 74 11 53 18 3 2 2
1988 2860 413 360 68 38 18 44 82 25 29
1989 2835 446 391 1 0 44 71 73 87 0 2 2
1990 2927 424 379 1 0 85 31 74 15 2 2 0
1991 2832 413 371 1 0 33 32 03 65 0 1 5
1992 3136 429 384 1 1 43 51 83 35 7 1 7
1993 2861 417 382 1 2 23 32 02 55 8 1 0
1994 2437 304 271 78 33 13 6 28 8 13
1995 3789 438 392 114 59 24 9 45 15 20
1996 3935 419 365 93 54 29 8 55 18 23
1997 3879 478 399 1 2 65 22 52 14 9 1 8
1998 4224 554 453 1 4 26 62 51 65 5 2 1
1999 4041 456 393 1 1 15 02 01 94 8 3 0
2000 3471 373 320 98 42 14 12 36 25 18
2001 3529 453 381 1 3 15 22 91 34 1 3 9
2002 3837 455 381 1 3 46 12 32 33 0 3 0
2003 4848 594 500 1 5 76 32 95 14 8 4 2
2004 7445 675 535 2 1 86 03 34 14 5 1 0 4
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Appendix Table 5: Price deflators and exchange rates, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 
Price deflators Exchange rates  -- Cfa/$ REER
GDP deflator CPI Official Parallel Market
Real from 
REER
Index = 100 in 
1997,2000
1961 9.70 8.24 245 261
1962 9.99 8.13 245 248
1963 10.29 8.21 245 263
1964 10.59 8.26 245 256
1965 10.91 8.47 245 266
1966 10.92 8.83 246 269
1967 11.05 9.03 246 259
1968 11.69 9.51 248 259
1969 11.91 9.94 260 305
1970 12.27 10.75 276 277
1971 12.15 10.70 275 278
1972 12.46 10.74 252 252
1973 14.10 11.93 223 223
1974 17.87 14.00 241 240
1975 18.64 15.60 214 210
1976 22.04 17.49 239 238
1977 28.37 22.28 246 246
1978 29.63 25.23 226 263
1979 31.57 29.36 213 217
1980 39.19 33.67 211 207 325 154
1981 40.35 36.64 272 274 359 132
1982 43.70 39.41 329 344 395 120
1983 47.66 41.64 381 411 442 116
1984 56.19 43.42 437 443 488 112
1985 56.39 44.23 449 445 504 112
1986 55.25 48.51 346 342 466 135
1987 53.00 51.88 301 312 449 150
1988 52.79 55.48 298 305 455 153
1989 52.26 56.06 319 337 461 144
1990 49.90 55.61 272 282 394 145
1991 50.23 56.54 282 289 396 140
1992 50.21 58.94 265 270 388 147
1993 53.31 60.21 283 289 409 145
1994 78.03 75.92 555 555 494 89
1995 86.65 86.77 499 499 510 102
1996 90.97 88.92 512 512 523 102
1997 94.80 92.50 584 584 584 100
1998 99.75 96.84 590 590 631 107
1999 100.67 97.60 616 616 652 106
2000 100.00 100.00 712 712 712 100
2001 104.12 104.28 733 733 758 103
2002 109.49 107.52 697 697 750 108
2003 111.06 111.12 581 581 668 115
2004 111.90 112.72 528 528 615 116
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; IMF, International Financial 
 Statistics; and Easterly (2006) for Parallel market exchange rates  
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Appendix Table 6: Commodity Prices (in $ per metric ton) important to Cote d'Ivoire 
Cocoa Coffee Cotton Rice Maize
ICCO Price ICO Price A Index Bangkok  US Gulf 
1961 485 668 642 137 48
1962 459 681 626 153 49
1963 552 622 643 143 54
1964 504 785 649 138 55
1965 365 677 634 136 55
1966 518 738 621 166 58
1967 598 738 675 221 54
1968 721 745 677 205 48
1969 903 728 612 185 52
1970 674 912 686 143 58
1971 539 930 819 130 58
1972 643 994 919 150 56
1973 1131 1098 1686 297 97
1974 1560 1291 1158 542 132
1975 1246 1343 1439 363 120
1976 2046 4965 1843 254 112
1977 3791 3396 1434 272 95
1978 3405 3434 1677 369 101
1979 3293 3565 1883 334 116
1980 2603 2357 2076 434 126
1981 2077 2307 1627 483 131
1982 1742 2680 1690 293 108
1983 2119 3020 1933 277 136
1984 2396 2658 1525 252 136
1985 2255 3191 1080 217 112
1986 2068 2434 1368 196 88
1987 1998 2120 1602 214 76
1988 1584 1889 1459 277 107
1989 1242 1161 1767 300 111
1990 1268 1108 1811 271 109
1991 1193 947 1496 294 107
1992 1099 1082 1305 268 104
1993 1111 2119 1495 237 102
1994 1396 3014 2022 269 108
1995 1433 2004 1912 321 123
1996 1455 1683 1764 338 165
1997 1619 1798 1641 302 117
1998 1676 1589 1345 305 102
1999 1135 1074 1199 249 90
2000 904 657 1275 204 88
2001 1088 591 975 173 90
2002 1779 819 1160 192 99
2003 1753 800 1469 199 105
2004 1551 1013 1229 246 112
2005 1545 1352 1244 288 98
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
Baffes (2007) for Cotton A index  
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Appendix Table 7: Cocoa Production and Trade, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 
















1961 0.26 311 81 88 88
1962 0.28 372 103 101 101
1963 0.29 336 98 100 100
1964 0.31 452 139 125 124 1 0.2 0.4 0.0
1965 0.33 372 122 140 126 10 55
1966 0.34 437 150 142 124 13 77
1967 0.36 410 147 129 105 18 79
1968 0.37 389 144 152 121 20 89
1969 0.39 467 181 148 119 20 89
1970 0.40 443 179 180 143 20 81 21
1971 0.42 534 226 181 147 19 99
1972 0.44 421 185 198 159 20 11 12 8
1973 0.50 420 209 174 143 18 81 0
1974 0.47 513 242 240 205 15 71 01
1975 0.50 464 231 219 170 23 17 14 8
1976 0.53 442 232 243 195 20 12 14 13
1977 0.70 435 304 199 158 20 11 14 7
1978 0.74 430 318 298 244 18 14 19 10
1979 0.78 507 398 217 171 21 13 14 11
1980 0.84 499 417 338 285 16 14 14 14
1981 0.90 516 465 508 438 14 16 23 17
1982 0.95 378 360 395 326 17 16 23 16
1983 0.95 432 411 352 286 19 14 20 18
1984 1.03 549 565 528 449 15 19 22 23
1985 1.10 505 555 514 419 18 24 27 25
1986 1.17 520 611 611 511 16 24 33 24
1987 1.23 538 664 611 511 16 21 29 29
1988 1.57 531 832 464 383 17 21 25 19
1989 1.37 568 781 805 715 11 27 28 18
1990 1.57 515 808 779 676 13 35 33 15
1991 1.41 542 765 805 702 13 30 33 19
1992 1.45 561 813 735 636 13 31 31 18
1993 1.45 554 804 893 789 12 27 31 25
1994 1.50 539 809 756 695 8 24 5 20
1995 1.90 589 1120 806 741 8 25 1 26
1996 1.90 650 1235 1155 1054 9 27 5 49
1997 1.90 589 1119 1108 993 10 29 5 58
1998 1.90 632 1201 1045 895 14 30 6 83
1999 1.85 706 1306 1283 1113 13 39 10 88
2000 1.80 776 1396 1285 1113 13 34 13 91
2001 1.78 711 1265 1252 1026 18 44 21 117
2002 1.70 744 1265 1247 1004 19 54 31 109
2003 1.80 751 1352 1183 948 20 60 34 94
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Appendix Table 8: Coffee Production and Trade, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 











1961 0.40 468 186 154
1962 0.46 211 97 141 0.1
1963 0.52 377 195 182 0.2
1964 0.56 466 261 204 0.5
1965 0.59 344 202 186 0.4
1966 0.62 443 273 181 0.4
1967 0.63 207 131 149 0.5
1968 0.65 443 288 214 0.7
1969 0.65 322 210 178 1.0
1970 0.65 429 280 195 1.4
1971 0.67 356 240 185 1.3
1972 0.70 387 269 188 1.5
1973 0.74 407 302 213 1.9
1974 0.85 231 196 263 2.5
1975 0.86 313 270 255 2.2
1976 0.90 342 308 323 2.4
1977 0.92 316 291 233 1.9
1978 0.96 205 196 230 4.1
1979 1.00 277 277 260 3.7
1980 1.03 242 250 206 3.7
1981 1.07 342 367 231 4.3
1982 1.11 223 248 272 4.7
1983 1.15 235 271 223 4.8
1984 1.08 79 85 188 4.4
1985 1.07 258 277 241 5.7
1986 1.10 241 265 230 5.7
1987 1.11 243 270 165 5.6
1988 1.14 164 187 203 16.1
1989 1.04 231 240 129 7.4
1990 1.32 216 286 232 6.8
1991 1.00 200 200 199 7.8
1992 0.80 321 257 203 7.3
1993 0.80 174 139 226 7.5
1994 0.80 182 146 122 7.5
1995 0.92 212 195 135 5.7
1996 0.79 212 168 144 5.2
1997 0.82 341 279 233 8.9
1998 0.88 386 341 215 9.3
1999 0.82 375 307 106 10.5
2000 0.83 405 336 308 9.2
2001 0.60 347 209 215 9.2
2002 0.52 350 182 144 10.6
2003 0.40 350 140 118 9.1
2004 0.46 335 154 142 4.2
Source: FAOSTAT  
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Appendix Table 9: Cotton Production and Trade, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 


















1961 0.01 0.464 6 2 4 0.2 0 2.0
1962 0.02 0.484 8 2 6 0.6 0 1.2
1963 0.02 0.503 12 4 8 0.3 1 6.1
1964 0.02 0.498 9 3 6 0.2 1 4.3
1965 0.02 0.522 10 4 7 0.2 2 4.9
1966 0.02 0.691 14 5 8 0.6 4 3.0
1967 0.03 0.808 25 10 15 0.1 9 12.2
1968 0.04 0.861 35 13 21 0.7 11 14.9
1969 0.05 0.885 44 17 26 0.3 12 21.6
1970 0.04 0.981 34 13 19 0.1 12 15.6
1971 0.04 0.873 31 12 18 0.0 13 17.9
1972 0.05 0.964 50 20 27 0.2 15 23.5
1973 0.06 0.952 54 21 31 0.3 17 26.1
1974 0.06 1.022 59 23 34 0.0 16 31.5
1975 0.06 1.037 61 24 36 0.6 12 28.9
1976 0.07 1.009 66 26 37 4.7 19 11.4
1977 0.06 1.180 76 31 43 8.3 15 2.0
1978 0.09 1.176 103 41 58 9.4 26 0.7
1979 0.11 1.071 115 47 65 10.7 31 0.0
1980 0.12 1.163 143 59 80 14.3 39 0.0
1981 0.13 1.081 137 56 76 12.9 39 0.0
1982 0.12 1.086 135 56 76 13.0 37 0.0
1983 0.13 1.223 157 66 87 14.7 49 0.0
1984 0.14 1.044 142 58 79 13.4 45 0.1
1985 0.15 1.454 212 88 117 20.1 54 0.0
1986 0.15 1.237 189 82 100 17.4 80 0.0
1987 0.16 1.341 214 93 115 21.5 66 0.2
1988 0.18 1.418 256 114 136 23.8 96 0.6
1989 0.21 1.362 291 128 155 27.0 89 0.0
1990 0.20 1.200 242 107 128 22.4 89 0.5
1991 0.20 1.315 261 116 135 22.2 97 2.3
1992 0.19 1.017 194 87 100 16.9 67 1.7
1993 0.20 1.173 239 106 124 20.1 96 3.9
1994 0.22 1.178 258 116 133 23.0 100 1.0
1995 0.20 1.059 216 93 120 20.9 88 0.5
1996 0.25 0.881 217 96 113 19.0 75 3.1
1997 0.25 1.075 265 114 143 30.1 94 0.0
1998 0.25 1.367 337 147 179 36.2 122 0.0
1999 0.31 1.290 400 177 191 33.1 131 0.1
2000 0.33 1.210 399 177 220 30.3 161 44.4
2001 0.28 1.025 287 123 162 24.9 113 17.9
2002 0.28 1.380 393 161 170 27.9 138 9.3
2003 0.33 1.200 396 172 175 17.3 144 73.2
2004 0.21 1.454 300 79 161 16.2 113 65.2
Source: FAOSTAT  
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Appendix Table 10: Rice Production and Trade, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 













1961 0.21 0.757 156 34
1962 0.26 0.881 229 43
1963 0.25 0.894 219 34
1964 0.27 0.915 248 58
1965 0.26 0.958 250 78
1966 0.26 1.068 276 83
1967 0.30 1.145 345 24
1968 0.30 1.218 365 47
1969 0.29 1.051 303 55
1970 0.29 1.092 316 79
1971 0.28 1.365 385 97
1972 0.28 1.135 320 77
1973 0.29 1.155 335 146
1974 0.32 1.281 406 64
1975 0.39 1.272 496 2
1976 0.40 1.156 460 2
1977 0.41 1.166 477 96
1978 0.43 1.178 504 126
1979 0.45 1.192 534 198
1980 0.36 1.167 420 253
1981 0.34 1.147 390 335
1982 0.35 1.286 450 357
1983 0.38 0.947 360 383
1984 0.41 1.251 514 321
1985 0.45 1.200 540 342
1986 0.51 1.100 560 361
1987 0.51 1.133 580 479
1988 0.52 1.175 610 266
1989 0.55 1.165 635 323
1990 0.57 1.155 660 308 33
1991 0.63 1.051 657 318 25
1992 0.65 1.017 660 343 16
1993 0.51 1.336 676 387 3 24
1994 0.62 1.123 701 253 3 0
1995 0.65 1.175 764 308 10 70
1996 0.48 1.349 650 259 7 40
1997 0.48 1.493 720 391 33 46
1998 0.48 1.357 654 396 114 8
1999 0.34 1.783 610 281 127 15
2000 0.34 1.821 622 352 62 26
2001 0.34 1.861 634 500 114 27
2002 0.34 1.900 647 568 133 17
2003 0.34 1.941 660 575 156 5
2004 0.50 1.900 950 702 148 19
Source: FAOSTAT  
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Appendix Table 11: Maize and Wheat Production and Trade, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 




hectare   1000 mt
   Net 
1000 mt 1000 mt        1000 mt
1961 0.19 0.529 99
1962 0.22 0.762 170 0
1963 0.25 0.681 169 0 0 36
1964 0.25 0.693 176 0 0 71
1965 0.26 0.695 180 0 0 64
1966 0.27 0.714 195 0 0 113
1967 0.28 0.775 220 0 0 62
1968 0.30 0.687 206 0 0 64
1969 0.33 0.781 260 0 0 47
1970 0.33 0.705 231 7 0 78
1971 0.34 0.832 280 5 0 30
1972 0.34 0.672 226 2 0 75
1973 0.35 0.669 232 0 0 139
1974 0.37 0.642 240 0 0 99
1975 0.51 0.522 264 1 0 76
1976 0.52 0.477 247 0 0 114
1977 0.54 0.480 258 3 0 149
1978 0.56 0.468 264 9 0 137
1979 0.58 0.471 275 13 0 151
1980 0.47 0.812 380 9 0 183
1981 0.49 0.816 400 19 0 209
1982 0.52 0.827 430 23 0 166
1983 0.55 0.745 410 -1 0 205
1984 0.60 0.874 520 2 0 205
1985 0.53 0.901 480 -31 0 206
1986 0.60 0.700 420 -57 0 212
1987 0.64 0.677 435 -20 0 236
1988 0.66 0.698 460 -2 0 216
1989 0.68 0.717 484 13 0 212
1990 0.69 0.720 497 -29 0 211
1991 0.68 0.727 497 -29 0 230
1992 0.66 0.785 514 -7 0 218
1993 0.67 0.777 517 8 0 213
1994 0.68 0.794 536 9 0 221
1995 0.69 0.806 552 1 0 259
1996 0.69 0.825 569 0 0 201
1997 0.40 1.465 586 -5 0 244
1998 0.36 1.722 620 5 0 285
1999 0.29 1.962 569 -22 0 245
2000 0.28 2.029 577 -7 0 257
2001 0.28 2.098 585 13 0 282
2002 0.27 2.169 592 -22 0 305
2003 0.27 2.242 600 -13 0 266
2004 0.40 2.275 910 7 0 214
Source: FAOSTAT  
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Appendix Table 12: Cocoa Prices, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2005 
Border Prices Wholesale Farmgate  Export Tax
ICCO in $ 
per mt
FAO export 
unit value in 
$ per mt
Prix CAF in 
CFA per kg
Port price in 
CFA per kg
Trader/Coop 
Price in CFA 




1961 485 449 64
1962 459 423 64
1963 552 458 70
1964 504 474 70
1965 365 350 55
1966 518 428 65
1967 598 535 70
1968 721 648 70
1969 903 826 77
1970 674 672 83
1971 539 670 85
1972 643 556 85
1973 1131 875 102
1974 1560 1262 149
1975 1246 1311 175
1976 2046 1535 178
1977 3791 2537 229
1978 3405 2928 250
1979 3293 3200 281
1980 2603 2798 300
1981 2077 1686 300
1982 1742 1530 300
1983 2119 1498 350
1984 2396 2028 375
1985 2255 2133 400
1986 2068 2226 400
1987 1998 2032 400
1988 1584 1821 400
1989 1242 1428 400
1990 1268 1063 200
1991 1193 1000 200
1992 1099 1005 200
1993 1111 1012 200
1994 1396 1121 315
1995 1433 1434 730 357 320 246
1996 1455 1336 768 357 310 276
1997 1619 1293 909 496 438 260 178
1998 1676 1493 948 614 504 181 104
1999 1135 1154 594 329 275 148 41
2000 904 759 712 423 333 180 132
2001 1088 981 987 603 522 283 189
2002 1779 1759 1292 779 648 363 269
2003 1753 1828 850 415 346 318 224
2004 1551 1583 821 378 298 315 221
2005 1545 887 416 336 318
Sources: BNETD and BCC for local currency prices and taxes, IMF for ICCO price
  FAOSTAT for unit values and older farmgate prices
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Appendix Table 13: Coffee Prices, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2005 
Border Prices Wholesale Farmgate  Export Tax
ICO 
in $ per mt
FAO export 
unit value in 
$ per mt
Prix CAF in 
CFA per kg
Port price in 
CFA per kg
Trader/Coop 
Price in CFA 
per kg CFA per kg
1961 668 532 75
1962 681 539 75
1963 622 545 80
1964 785 629 90
1965 677 565 75
1966 738 675 90
1967 738 691 90
1968 745 677 90
1969 728 656 95
1970 912 796 105
1971 930 821 105
1972 994 765 105
1973 1098 925 120
1974 1291 1007 150
1975 1343 1125 150
1976 4965 1723 173
1977 3396 3467 264
1978 3434 2530 262
1979 3565 3015 307
1980 2357 3125 250
1981 2307 1927 263
1982 2680 1710 269
1983 3020 1858 315
1984 2658 2246 355
1985 3191 2591 496
1986 2434 2935 445
1987 2120 2381 409
1988 1889 1913 375
1989 1161 1784 223
1990 1108 1030 198
1991 947 924 210
1992 1082 821 134
1993 2119 712 170
1994 3014 1226 650
1995 2004 2520 864 600 -19
1996 1683 1593 767 425 26
1997 1798 1274 898 470 142
1998 1589 1490 847 600 538 42
1999 1074 1334 629 337 37
2000 657 792 375 281 210 47
2001 591 471 324 222 179 6
2002 819 503 477 286 219 37
2003 800 657 400 227 166 49
2004 1013 743 483 277 175 50
2005 1352 631 464 316 63
Sources: BNETD and BCC for local currency prices and taxes, IMF for ICO price
FAOSTAT for unit values and older farmgate prices
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Appendix Table 14: Cotton Prices, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 









in $ per mt
Cotton Lint 
FAO export 
















Gin to port 
CFA per kg
FOB to CIF 
% of CIF
1961 642 286 40
1962 626 206 40
1963 643 218 40
1964 649 227 40
1965 634 346 40
1966 621 344 34 34 84 40
1967 675 419 34 34 84 40
1968 677 521 34 34 84 40
1969 612 521 34 34 84 40
1970 686 498 35 40 87 40 50 8 8.1
1971 819 487 40 40 99 41 50 8 7.1
1972 919 704 40 40 99 40 50 9 7.1
1973 1686 850 40 45 99 39 55 9 6.1
1974 1158 1363 45 70 112 40 60 11 7.6
1975 1439 1395 70 70 175 40 65 12 7.4
1976 1843 1229 70 80 175 41 75 14 6.2
1977 1434 1391 80 80 200 40 80 16 7.3
1978 1677 1400 80 80 200 41 90 17 7.1
1979 1883 1552 80 80 200 41 100 20 7.0
1980 2076 1779 80 80 200 41 110 22 7.3
1981 1627 1705 80 80 200 42 120 23 8.7
1982 1690 1476 80 80 200 42 130 26 8.7
1983 1933 1677 100 100 250 41 140 29 9.0
1984 1525 1732 115 115 288 42 145 31 10.5
1985 1080 1394 115 115 288 44 150 31 12.3
1986 1368 1001 115 115 288 44 150 30 10.0
1987 1602 1248 115 115 288 44 135 30 9.0
1988 1459 1449 115 115 288 44 120 28 9.7
1989 1767 1255 115 115 288 44 125 27 7.8
1990 1811 1787 115 100 288 44 120 26 8.1
1991 1496 1547 90 90 225 45 115 26 8.7
1992 1305 1647 90 90 205 44 120 27 10.3
1993 1495 1413 90 110 205 45 150 35 11.1
1994 2022 1375 105 160 239 44 175 45 7.3
1995 1912 1567 160 173 364 44 190 50 7.8
1996 1764 1543 170 182 386 43 200 51 7.9
1997 1641 1415 180 205 409 44 210 52 7.5
1998 1345 1369 200 200 455 43 225 53 8.4
1999 1199 1147 200 183 455 44 230 53 8.9
2000 1275 921 281 216 466 0 43 245 54 7.7
2001 975 1102 222 190 477 0 43 225 56 8.4
2002 1160 978 286 180 479 0 43 220 57 7.6
2003 1469 1231 227 200 488 0 40 215 58 6.2
2004 1229 1372 277 185 17 45 220 59 7.1
2005 1244 140 17 43 225 60 7.3
Sources: FAOSTAT for unit values and farmgate prices
BNETD for later farmgate prices (after 1999) and export taxes
Baffes (2007) for farmgate prices, ginning ratios and A Index
Transportation and 
Marketing Margins
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Appendix Table 15: Cereals Prices, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 
Rice 
Bangkok 
in $ per mt
Rice 
FAO import 




in $ per mt
Maize 
FAO import 








1961 137 120 48 18
1962 153 133 49 250 18
1963 143 126 54 18
1964 138 137 55 91 18
1965 136 115 55 18
1966 166 152 58 18 12
1967 221 147 54 438 18 12
1968 205 161 48 417 18 12
1969 185 131 52 89 20 12
1970 143 93 58 99 20 12
1971 130 82 58 87 20 12
1972 150 113 56 533 20 13
1973 297 263 97 235 20 19
1974 542 464 132 127 65 19
1975 363 615 120 339 65 20
1976 254 672 112 163 65 25
1977 272 295 95 125 65 36
1978 369 331 101 172 65 60
1979 334 323 116 206 65 60
1980 434 452 126 202 50 68
1981 483 384 131 237 60 72
1982 293 294 108 190 69 58
1983 277 247 136 239 68 65
1984 252 245 136 225 80 72
1985 217 174 112 549 80 60
1986 196 224 88 542 84 76
1987 214 224 76 165 84 45
1988 277 256 107 148 60 45
1989 300 322 111 808 60 45
1990 271 319 109 726 60 45
1991 294 300 107 178 60 45
1992 268 320 104 189 60 62 5.4
1993 237 301 102 207 75 62 6.2
1994 269 300 108 487 75 71 5.4
1995 321 292 123 385 110 81 5.5
1996 338 301 165 502 110 73 12.5
1997 302 258 117 214 150 105 12.9
1998 305 274 102 441 113 92 9.3
1999 249 253 90 396 108 86 8.3
2000 204 218 88 131 110 85 6.8
2001 173 195 90 344 112 86 6.1
2002 192 179 99 257 108 87 5.0
2003 199 212 105 263 109 88 5.0
2004 246 246 112 300
Sources: FAOSTAT for unit values and farmgate prices, IMF for border prices
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percent of pre 
tax border 
price





































1995 43.8 42.9 50.8 26.2 7.6
1996 40.4 39.5 56.1 27.4 9.6
1997 48.2 48.2 40.1 27.4 23.6 8.9
1998 53.2 49.7 23.6 13.6 19.9 14.3
1999 46.3 43.7 33.2 9.2 26.2 12.1
2000 46.8 46.8 33.8 24.8 20.5 16.9
2001 52.9 51.1 40.2 26.8 14.3 11.5
2002 50.2 46.6 39.1 29.0 16.1 14.1
2003 40.7 35.4 59.8 42.1 22.0 13.0
2004 36.3 31.2 62.3 43.7 25.3 15.8
2005 37.9 32.5 55.8 27.0 14.0
Source: Calculations from prices in Table A11 and IMF for exchange rates
   Farmgate Price
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exch rate using REER
ad valorem 
equivalent
percent of pre 
tax border 
price





































1995 69.4 67.9 -2.2
1996 55.4 54.2 3.5
1997 52.3 52.3 18.8
1998 63.5 59.4 5.2 25.5 7.7
1999 53.6 50.6 6.3
2000 56.0 56.0 14.3 14.3 21.6
2001 55.2 53.4 2.0 30.1 13.5
2002 45.9 42.7 8.3 35.1 15.2
2003 41.5 36.1 13.9 35.4 17.4
2004 36.2 31.1 11.5 36.0 23.6
2005 50.1 42.9 11.0 18.3 26.0
Source: Calculations from prices in Table A12 and IMF for exchange rates
Farmgate Price
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Appendix Table 18: Cotton prices as % of border prices, Cote d’Ivoire, 1966 to 2004 
Lint Price

















1966 60 55 99
1967 55 52 81
1968 54 52 65
1969 57 49 62
1970 58 58 63 45 8.1
1971 47 47 74 46 7.1
1972 46 46 56 47 7.1
1973 32 32 52 44 6.1
1974 68 68 34 32 7.6
1975 61 62 58 35 7.4
1976 48 48 60 36 6.2
1977 61 61 58 38 7.3
1978 56 48 63 43 7.1
1979 52 51 61 49 7.0
1980 48 31 53 53 7.3
1981 48 36 43 59 8.7
1982 38 31 41 65 8.7
1983 36 31 39 55 9.0
1984 46 41 38 51 10.5
1985 62 55 46 54 12.3
1986 61 45 83 55 10.0
1987 59 39 77 51 9.0
1988 66 43 67 45 9.7
1989 50 34 72 47 7.8
1990 50 34 59 51 8.1
1991 52 37 52 56 8.7
1992 66 45 47 58 10.3
1993 65 45 51 60 11.1
1994 35 39 31 49 7.3
1995 44 43 46 49 7.8
1996 51 50 49 48 7.9
1997 53 53 50 45 7.5
1998 64 60 56 48 8.4
1999 62 58 64 54 8.9
2000 60 60 71 0 47 7.7
2001 67 65 59 0 51 8.4
2002 56 52 70 0 53 7.6
2003 62 54 68 0 44 6.2
2004 69 59 3.2                54 7.1
2005 53 46 3.2                70 7.3








in percent of 
lint farmgate
 













exch rate using REER
using 
official 
exch rate using REER







1 9 6 19 48 8
1 9 6 28 58 4
1 9 6 39 08 4
1 9 6 48 37 9
1 9 6 59 89 0
1 9 6 67 46 88 47 7
1 9 6 77 67 39 08 5
1968 70 67 102 97
1 9 6 99 07 78 97 6






Appendix Table 19: Cereals prices as % of border prices, Cote d’Ivoire, 1961 to 2004 
1971 135 134 75 74
1972 108 108 93 93
1 9 7 35 25 28 78 7
1 9 7 49 09 06 06 0
1 9 7 57 67 77 88 0
1 9 7 66 26 39 39 4
1977 138 138 154 153
1978 134 115 264 227
1979 145 143 244 239
1980 80 52 256 166
1981 88 67 203 154
1982 110 91 163 136
1983 111 96 125 108
1984 115 103 121 109
1985 157 140 119 106
1986 167 124 250 186
1987 192 129 198 133
1988 121 79 141 92
1989 90 62 127 88
1990 106 73 151 105
1991 109 78 148 106
1992 109 74 225 153 5.4
1993 135 94 215 148 6.2
1994 69 78 119 134 5.4
1995 116 114 132 129 5.5 20
1996 110 107 87 85 12.5 20
1997 153 153 154 153 12.9 20
1998 107 100 153 143 9.3 20
1999 107 101 155 146 8.3 20
2000 109 109 135 135 6.8 20 27
2001 120 116 131 127 6.1 20 26
2002 133 124 126 117 5.0 20 41
2003 137 119 144 125 5.0 18
2004 18
Source: Calculations from prices in Table A14 and IMF for exchange rates
Tariffs are from FAO(2003) and WTO (1995), retail premium from Ory   
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Appendix Table 20: Prices and protection as a percentage of border prices, Cote d’Ivoire, 2001 and 2004 
  Producer price  52.9 36.3 55.2 36.2 67 69 59 55 85
  E x p o r t  t a x 2 8 . 7 3 8 . 4 2 . 0 1 0 . 30 3 . 20000
  Trader margins 18.4 25.3 42.8 53.4 30 18 20 20 15
  NTB 0 0 2 3 3 337 2 1 2 500
  Production subsidy 
a
  C o n s u m e r  t a x n an an an an an a2 01 82 01 8
Importables Rice Wheat Fruits & Vegetables Agricultural Products
2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2000
  Producer price  120 137 na na
  Import tariff 6.1 10 6.1 10 22.4 20 16.4 20
  NTB 
b 14 27
  Production subsidy 
a na na
  C o n s u m e r  t a x 2 01 82 01 82 01 82 01 8
Non-Tradeables Maize       Cassava and Yams
2001 2004 2001 2004
  Producer price  131 144 na na
  Import tariff 6.1 10 19.9 20
  Production subsid
Exportables Cocoa Coffee Cotton Bananas Palm oil




  C o n s u m e r  t a x 2 01 82 01 8
a For many exportables and possibly rice there are likely input subsidies, but there is no information to quantify their magnitude
b Large retail margins for rice suggest quantitative restrictions may still apply, but don't benefit farmers
 Sources: Author's calculations and estimates from data cited elsewhere in this chapter – BNETD (2006); FAOSTAT (2006); 






es (FOB or CIF) in appendix 
tables or using FAO i 03 
(World Bank 2006b). 2004 MFN Tariffs from UNCTAD, TRAINS (2006). 
FAO(2003), etc. All prices, taxes and margins are expressed as a percentage of the reference (border) pric




   
dix Table 21: Annual distortion estimates, Cote D’Ivoire, 1961 to 2005 
 Nominal rates of assistance to covered products  (percent) 
Cocoa Coffee Cotton  Rice  Cassava  Plantain  Yam 
All 
covered  













































-28 -53  na -25 0 0 0  -22 
-39 -48  na -24 0 0 0  -28 
-31 -52  na -19 0 0 0  -33 
-28 -55  na -22 0 0 0  -30 
-40 -51 -16 -36  0  0  0 -35 
-42 -50 -20 -50  0  0  0 -32 
-52 -50 -20 -40  0  0  0 -37 
-65 -54 -25 -38  0  0  0 -43 
-43 -55 -17 -12  0  0  0 -37 
-28 -57 -32  22  0  0  0 -31 
-33 -55 -33  17  0  0  0 -33 
-49 -48 -54  55  0  0  0 -28 
-49 -48 -11 -21  0  0  0 -33 
-15 -43 -17  34  0  0  0 -14 
-53 -84 -35  70  0  0  0 -61 
-69 -66 -17  53  0  0  0 -48 
-64  -69  -32 6 0 0 0  -43 
-50 -58 -24  42  0  0  0 -32 
-55 -65 -52 -27  0  0  0 -41 
-49 -66 -43 -41  0  0  0 -42 
-44 -73 -49 -11  0  0  0 -38 
-52 -75 -52 -12  0  0  0 -43 
-59  -71  -38 3 0 0 0  -37 
-55 -67 -16  15  0  0  0 -44 
-47 -58 -30  45  0  0  0 -32 
-43 -54 -41  38  0  0  0 -29 
-29 -53 -37 -25  0  0  0 -22 
-11 -55 -50 -31  0  0  0 -16 
-49 -51 -48 -11  0  0  0 -26 
-46 -40 -43 -18  0  0  0 -20 
-40 -66 -30  -9  0  0  0 -19 
-44 -79 -29  22  0  0  0 -21 
-42 -53 -42 -11  0  0  0 -23 
-42  -27  -36 6 0 0 0  -19 
-45 -42 -27  -2  0  0  0 -26 
-40 -44 -24  34  0  0  0 -23 
-36 -36 -12  -7  0  0  0 -23 
-43  -46  -11 5 0 0 0  -22 
-39 -32 -12  20  0  0  0 -18 
-39  -39  -3  35 0 0 0  -23 
-43 -51 -21  19  0  0  0 -29 
-56 -58 -23  48  0  0  0 -33 
-60 -62 -10  19  0  0  0 -35 
-58  -46  -22 1 0 0 0  -34 
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Appendix Table 21 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Cote D’Ivoire, 1961 to 2005 
(b)  ucts, to exportable
b 
and import-competing  agricultural industries, and relative  to non-agricultural industrie
     (p  
Total ag NRA 
Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural prod
 b c s
   ercent)
Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 










compet   All 
Non-ag 
tradables 










1961  0 -31  -8  -35 16  -44 -25 -50 19
1962  1 -22  -8  -29 15  -39 -19 -45 9
1963  2 -28  -8  -32 18  -42 -23 -46 14
1964  3 -33 -10  -35 14  -43 -27 -48 13
1965  4 -30 -10  -35 12  -42 -25 -50 10
1966  5 -35 -12  -37 12  -44 -29 -49 3
1967  6 -32 -10  -35 13  -43 -26 -47 -11
1968  7 -37 -11  -39 11  -45 -31 -50 -3
1969  8 -43 -13  -44 10  -49 -35 -57 0
1970  9 -37 -14  -39 11  -45 -32 -51 10
1971  10 -31 -14  -34 11  -40 -27 -48 19
1972  11 -33 -12  -35 12  -42 -28 -49 21
1973  12 -28 -14  -31 8  -37 -25 -48 32
1974  13 -33 -14  -35 7  -40 -29 -48 -3
1975  14 -14 -12  -18 10  -26 -14 -35 27
1976  15 -61 -17  -57 5  -59 -50 -73 21
1977  16 -48  2  -45 22  -55 -36 -64 53
1978  17 -43  10  -39 35  -55 -30 -62 54
1979  18 -32  6  -33 30  -48 -24 -52 58
1980  19 -41  -3  -40 21  -51 -31 -57 24
1981  20 -42 -16  -45 6  -48 -35 -56 -1
1982  21 -38  -1  -39 23  -50 -28 -58 34
1983  22 -43 -12  -48 11  -53 -36 -61 16
1984  23 -37 -11  -43 11  -49 -31 -58 20
1985  24 -44 -10  -44 13  -50 -35 -57 25
1986  25 -32  -9  -37 17  -46 -27 -50 33
1987  26 -29  -8  -35 19  -45 -25 -47 33
1988  27 -22  -8  -29 19  -40 -20 -37 14
1989  28 -16  -8  -22 18  -34 -14 -29 8
1990  29 -26 -13  -37 11  -43 -23 -49 11
1991  30 -20 -12  -32 12  -39 -18 -46 10
1992  31 -19 -11  -31 11  -38 -17 -47 17
1993  32 -21 -11  -32 13  -40 -18 -51 24
1994  33 -23 -13  -32 9  -37 -20 -46 14
1995  34 -19 -14  -28 7  -33 -18 -41 16
1996  35 -26 -14  -30 7  -34 -22 -45 13
1997  36 -23 -14  -26 8  -31 -20 -42 23
1998  37 -23 -15  -27 7  -32 -20 -38 10
1999  38 -22 -15  -28 8  -33 -20 -43 13
2000  39 -18 -16  -25 5  -29 -18 -40 15
2001  40 -23 -16  -28 5  -31 -21 -40 19
2002  41 -29 -16  -32 4  -34 -25 -43 15
2003  42 -33 -17  -38 4  -40 -29 -53 20
2004  43 -35 -16  -40 4  -42 -30 -56 15
2005  44 -34 -16  -40 4  -42 -29 -54 10
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  
c. The Relative Rate of Assistance A) is d ned as 1 [(100+N Aag
t)/ 
(100+NRAnonag
t)-1],  e NRA
t ar e perce ge NRA or the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
 (RR efi 00* R
wher ag
t and NRAnonag e th nta s f
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Appendix Table 21 (cont’d): Annual distortion estimates, Cote D’Ivoire, 1961 to 2005 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products, (percent)






1961  9  na 4 4  35  5  17  25 
1962  13  na 8 6 6  22  25 
1963  3 6 4 5  17  25 
1964  4  25 
1965  9 5  17  25 
38 0 25 
1 11  27 
35 1 24 
26 1 26 
38 1 24 
35 1 24 
37 2 4 25 
31 2 24 
2 12  23 
25 2 27 
47 1 26 
29 1 23 
21 2 25 
23 1 22 
19 2 26 
26 2 25 
24 2 26 
26 2 24 
7 7 2 24 
25 2 25 
19 2 21 
17 3 18 
11 4 17 
10 6 17 
10 4 20 
4 6 3   23 
0 8 2 24 
1 8 3 25 
10 4 26 
8 7 3 26 
3 6 3 31 
2 9 3 30 
10 3 28 
6 8 3 31 
0 4 4 32 
4 2 2 26 
29 
7 7 8  27 

















1966  12   6 3 4  13 
1967  16 21  4  4 16 
1968  14   8 3 3  12 
1969  23   6 3 3  12 
1970  15   5 2
3
 3  12 
1971  16   5   3  12 
1972  14   5   2  11 
1973  19   6 4 2  11 
1974  26 21  4  2 11 
1975  17   8 3 3  15 
1976  12   2 2 2 7 
1977  28   3 4 3  10 
1978  28   4 5 4  12 
1979  26   3 5 5  15 
1980  29   4 5 3  12 
1981  25   4 5 3  12 
1982  19   3 4 5  16 
1983  23   2 3 5  14 
1984  3  3 4 5  17 
1985  29   2 3 3  11 
1986  31   2 4 5  15 
1987  33   2 4 
5
6  17 
1988  35   4   6  19 
1989  29   5 5 7  21 
1990  27   4 5 8  22 
1991  2  4 6  10 25 
1992  2  3 6 9  28 
1993  2  3 6 8  26 
1994  23   3 5 7  22 
1995  2  4 5 6  22 
1996  3  6 5 6  11 
1997  3  6 4 5  11 
1998  33   5 4 5  12 
1999  2  5 4 6  16 
2000  3  4 5 6  15 
2001  4  4 6 6 9 
2002  45 3 3 3 5 6 7 
2003  41 2 4 3 
2004  40 3 2 4 7 7 
2005  39 3 2 5 7 9 8 
a. At farmgate undistorted prices    Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
   
 